The Immorality of Denial by Cohen, Jonathan R.
University of Florida Levin College of Law
UF Law Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
3-1-2005
The Immorality of Denial
Jonathan R. Cohen
University of Florida Levin College of Law, cohenjr@law.ufl.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub
Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, and the Ethics and Professional
Responsibility Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact outler@law.ufl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jonathan R. Cohen, The Immorality of Denial, 79 Tul. L. Rev. 903 (2005), available at http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub/41
The Immorality of Denial
Jonathan R. Cohen*
Tis Aracle is the first of a two-part series critically examinng the role of lawyers in
assisting clients in denying responsibility for harms they have caused. If a person injures
anothe, the moral response is for the injurer actively to take responsibility for what he has done.
in contrast, the common practice within our legal culture is for injurers to deny responsibility for
harms they commit The immoral, in other words, has become the legally normal. In this
Article, Professor Cohen analyzes the moral foundations of responsibility-taking He also
explores the moral, psychological, and spiritual risks to injures who knowingly deny
responsibility for hanns they have caused.
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 904
II. DENIAL AS MORAL FAILURE ........................................................ 909
A. Looking in the Mirror ........................................................ 909
B. Varieties ofDenial .............................................................. 910
1. Obfuscation ................................................................ 912
2. D elay .......................................................................... 9 12
3. Loaded Processes ....................................................... 913
4. Avoidance and Counterattack .................................... 915
5. Other Forms of Avoiding Responsibility .................. 918
MI. THE ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS OF INJURERS ................................... 919
A. When the Injurer Is HeldAccountable .............................. 923
B. When the Injurer Is Not HeldA ccountable ....................... 932
IV SOME OBJECTIONS ....................................................................... 937
A. A SkepticalResponse ........................................................ 937
B. Three Further Objections ................................................... 945
1. Cultural Norms .......................................................... 946
2. Substantive Fairness ................................................... 948
3. Prematurity ................................................................. 950
V CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 953
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Florida, Levin College of Law,
Gainesville, Florida. A.B. (1987), J.D. (1992), Ph.D. (1993), Harvard University. I thank
Thomas Cotter, Berta HemAindez-Truyol, Richard Hiers, Michelle Jacobs, Samuel Levine,
William Page, Juan Perea, Carrie Petrucci, Sharon Rush, Andrea K. Schneider, Thomas L.
Shaffer, Christopher Slobogin, David Wexler, and Walter Weyrauch, as well as participants in
faculty workshops at Florida State University, Stetson University, and the University of
Florida for their comments. I appreciate the research assistance of Natausha Samuels and
Rachel Yff, the secretarial aid of Cindy Zimmerman, and the library research services of
Christopher Vallandingham. I am grateful for the financial support provided by the Levin
College of Law summer research fund. All errors are mine alone.
903
TULANE LA W REVIEW
Not everything that Js faced can be changed but nothing can be
changed undl it is faced'
I. INTRODUCTION
Somewhere between childhood and adulthood, our society, in part
through our legal system, dismantles one of life's most basic moral
lessons. If a child injures another, good parents will teach that child to
take responsibility for what he has done. If an adult injures another
and goes to a lawyer, the usual focus is on precisely the reverse:
denial. The goal is to avoid responsibility or, if that is not possible, to
minimize liability. To see how morally bizarre this common practice
is, imagine instead that the adult injurer were to see a minister or
psychologist. It is nearly axiomatic that such professionals would try
to help the injurer face what he has done and take responsibility for it.
The benefits to the injured party notwithstanding, from the viewpoint
of the injurels moral and psychological development, embracing
responsibility for harms one has caused is critical. Indeed, it is hard to
imagine a more basic ethical dictate or psychological prescription than
voluntarily assuming responsibility when one has harmed another. Yet
our legal system typically encourages denial. The immoral has
become the normal. Although frequently, but not always, denial
benefits injurers economically, this path of moral regression poses
significant psychological and spiritual risks for injurers.
This Article is the first of a two-part series, and it may be useful
to provide an overview of the entire argument. My overall enterprise is
to critically examine the practice of lawyers assisting clients in denying
responsibility for harms they have caused. This Article explores the
foundational moral question, "What are the ethical obligations of a
person who injures another?"2 In response, I argue that injurers have a
moral obligation to take responsibility for harms they commit.
Further, I argue that, possible economic benefits notwithstanding,
those who deny responsibility for such harms face significant
psychological and spiritual risks. In the second part of this series, the
1. Although commonly attributed to the author James Baldwin, to the best of my
knowledge, there is no specific text indicating Baldwin made this statement. See, e.g.,
Taunya Lovell Banks, Exploring Whte Resistance to Reconciliation in the United States, 55
RutGERs L. REV. 903, 964 n.1 (2003) (attributing this statement to Baldwin). Baldwin did
write, "To defend oneself against a fear is simply to insure that one will, one day, be
conquered by it; fears must be faced." JAMES BALDWIN, THE FIRE NEXT TIME 26-27 (1995).
2. By "person" I include "legal persons" such as corporations, though sensitivity is
needed regarding differences between individual and organizational "persons." See infra note
59 and accompanying text.
904 [Vol. 79:903
2005] THE IMMORALITY OF DENIAL 905
focus switches from the client to the lawyer.3 There I argue that, given
the psychological and spiritual risks posed by denial, lawyers should
discuss more often with clients the possibility of responsibility-taking.
I also address aspects of our legal and social cultures that may help
support the practice of legal denial. These include economic
incentives encouraging denial, dispute resolution mechanisms
encouraging denial, the role of legal education in training lawyers to be
complicit in denial, and broader aspects of social construction
supporting legal denial, such as cultural individualism and social
denials of structural injustices like conquest and racism.
A few words about the scope and approach of the overall project
may be in order at the outset. In terms of scope, I will focus on civil
cases rather than criminal cases. This is not because the concept of
responsibility-taking has no place in criminal law, but because criminal
law implicates distinct issues.4 These include the Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination and related concerns about inquisitorial
examination and coerced confessions,5 the gravity of human liberty (as
reflected in the different burdens of proof in criminal versus civil
cases), and the State, rather than the injured person, as a party to
criminal cases. Furthermore, different legal ethics rules (e.g.,
3. See Jonathan R. Cohen, The Culture of Legal Denial, 84 NEB. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2005).
4. For a fine treatment of counseling responsibility-taking in the criminal setting
through a literary lens, see Robert F Cochran, Jr., Crime, Confession, and the Counselor-at-
Law: Lessons from Dostoyevsky, 35 Hous. L. REV. 327, 329 (1998) (proposing that
criminal-defense attorneys should consider discussing confession with their clients in light of
the costs of psychological guilt). See also Gerard V Bradley, Plea Bargaining and the
Criminal Defendant Obligation to Plead Guilty, 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 65, 65-66 (1999)
(arguing that the common good and a "sound view of crime and punishment" require
favorable decisions for those who plead guilty); Catherine Greene Burnett, Of Crime,
Punishment, Community and an Accused's Responsibility to Plead Guilty: A Response to
GerardBradley, 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 281, 282 (1999) (asserting that Bradley "stopped far short
of suggesting immorality in a guilty defendant's choice not to plead guilty"). Several
commentators have written excellent related pieces. See, e.g., JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME,
SHAME AND REINTEGRATION (1989) (considering the possibility of social reintegration of the
criminal through shaming); Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values
and Criminal Procedure: The Case ofAlford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L.
REV 1361, 1362-67 (2003) (critiquing the peculiar structure of criminal pleading practices
designed to avoid direct acceptance of responsibility); Stephen P. Garvey, Punishment as
Atonement, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1801, 1802 (1999) (envisioning punishment as "a form of
secular penance aimed at the expiation of the wrongdoer's guilt and his reconciliation with
the victim and the community").
5. See Rogers v Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961) (discussing the
admissibility of an allegedly coerced confession). See generally MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE
176-210 (John W Strong et al. eds., 5th ed. 1999) (discussing the privilege against self-
incrimination).
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governing prosecutors6) and, most fundamentally, different rationales
occur in the civil versus criminal settings. Thus, I caution against
carrying, by rote, arguments made here concerning the civil setting
into the criminal realm.8
In terms of approach, the arguments presented here and in the
follow-up work are examined through the individualistic framework of
what is often called "zealous advocacy."9 It is not my goal to provide a
critique of that framework or, in the main, to argue against denial
based upon social reasons such as the costs of denial to the injured
party and to society.0 I do this for several reasons. First and foremost,
properly understood, nothing within the concept of zealous advocacy
precludes conversations between lawyers and clients about
responsibility-taking. Indeed, the reverse is true: devoted lawyers,
who wish to serve their clients as best they can, should consider
6. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2001) (setting forth the
responsibilities of a prosecutor). Comment 1 provides, "A prosecutor has the responsibility
of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it
specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is
decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence." Id. R. 3.8 cmt. 1.
7. Though some resist such distinction, many legal ethics scholars view the criminal
and civil settings as quite different. Compare, e.g., Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer Amoral
Ethical Role.- A Defense, a Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613,
621-22 (resisting differentiation), with Murray L. Schwartz, The Zeal of the CivilAdvocate,
in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYER'S ROLES AND LAWYER'S ETHICS 150, 156 (David Luban ed.,
1983) [hereinafter THE GOOD LAWYER] (supporting differentiation). For a debate on the
matter, see generally William H. Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, 91 MICH. L. REV
1703 (1993), and David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different., 91 MICH. L. REv. 1729
(1993). Overall, I support the view that legal ethics should be tailored for different aspects of
legal practice, both in terms of subject area (e.g., criminal versus civil) and activity (e.g.,
advocacy versus negotiation). I also agree with the concern that visions of the need for zeal
by defense attorneys conducting trials mistakenly dominates our thinking about legal ethics in
other domains. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Limits ofAdversatial Ethics, in ETHICS IN
PRACTICE: LAWYERS' ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION 123, 128 (Deborah L.
Rhode ed., 2000); Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism andAccountability ofLawyers,
66 CAL. L. REv. 669, 670-71 (1978) [hereinafter Schwartz, Professionalism].
8. See infm text accompanying notes 186-188.
9. Despite some softening of language with the adoption of the Model Rules in
1983 [compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2001) ("A lawyer shall act with
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client."), with MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1979) ("The duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal
system, is to represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law... ")], the language
of zealousness still remains in the commentary to the Model Rules. See MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2001) ("A lawyer should act with ... zeal in advocacy upon
the client's behalf."). Fundamentally, irrespective of the exact language of these rules, the
model of the lawyer as "zealous advocate" remains deeply entrenched in both the legal and
public mind.
10. The discussions of denial's costs to the injured party and to society, as well as the
possible need for multiplied or punitive damages, are exceptions to this. See infa text
accompanying notes 65-68, 171.
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discussing responsibility-taking with clients. (Note that I write
consider Whether to engage in such a discussion depends on the
particulars of the case.) Second, whether one is a defender or a critic
of the zealous advocacy framework," historically speaking, it is a very
robust framework that has dominated the U.S. legal mindset for over
two hundred years.' Hence, I see some merit to working "within" its
11. The literature on the ethics of zealous advocacy is vast. For a few outstanding
defenses of those ethics, see MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY
SYSTEM (1975) (defending zealous advocacy on systemic grounds); Charles P. Curtis, The
Ethics ofAdvocacy, 4 STAN. L. REv. 3, 4-6 (1951) (emphasizing the combative, game-like
quality of litigation); and Pepper, supra note 7, at 633-35 (defending zealous advocacy based
on client autonomy). Also of note is Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend- The MoM
Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1066-67 (1976) (defending a
lawyer's partisanship through a friendship analogy), though many reject Fried's view. See,
e.g., Edward A. Dauer & Arthur Allen Leff, Correspondence: The Lawyer as Friend 86 YALE
L.J. 573, 573-84 (1977). For critiques of the zealous advocacy framework, an excellent place
to begin is DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 104-27 (1988), in
which Luban attacks the role of ethics justifications in defending zealous advocacy. There
are many other critiques of zealous advocacy See, e.g., THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 7, at
83, 123, 150 (collecting various essays critiquing zealous advocacy); RICHARD ZITRiN &
CAROL M. LANGFORD, THE MORAL COMPASS OF THE AMERICAN LAWYER: TRUTH, JUSTICE,
POWER, AND GREED 74-91 (1999) (decrying adversarial excesses); Marvin E. Frankel, The
Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1032-33 (1975) (arguing that
lawyers ought to devote themselves more to pursuing truth rather than just victory); Deborah
L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REv. 589, 591 (1985)
(exploring the conflict among professional legal "ideals, ideologies, and institutions");
Thomas L. Shaffer, The Unique, Novel, and UnsoundAdversary Ethic, 41 VAND. L. REv. 697,
703-12 (1988) (presenting a historical critique of zealous advocacy, particularly with respect
to communitarian rationales); William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural
Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 29, 33, 130-44 (deconstructing arguments
for zealous advocacy and offering a positive vision of "non-professional advocacy"); Richard
Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HuM. RTS. 1, 5-7 (1975)
(questioning the view that lawyers are "not accountable" for their clients' ends). For a
summary of the history of this ethical debate over the past three decades, see David Luban,
Reason and Passion in Legal Ethics, 51 STAN. L. REV 873, 877-80 (1999).
12. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future ofLegalEthics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1244
(1991) (tracing the historical development); see also Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and
Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 43-48 (1982) (describing the continuing dominance of the
adversarial paradigm as the lawyer's "standard philosophical map"). The U.S. debate over the
lawyer as zealous advocate traces back to the dialogues of David Hoffman and George
Sharswood in the early to mid- 1800's. See THOMAS L. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND
A LAWYER: LAW FOR THE INNOCENT 60-63 (1981); Hazard, supra, at 1249-50. To see the
resilience of the paradigm, consider that, to this day, probably the most famous description of
legal ethics is the image of the unyielding zealous advocate painted by Lord Brougham in the
1821 English trial of Queen Caroline almost two hundred years ago:
An advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the world,
and that person is his client. To save that client by all means and expedients, and at
all hazards and costs to other persons, and, amongst them, to himself, is his first
and only duty; and in performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the
torments, the destruction which he may bring upon others.
FREEDMAN, supra note 11, at 9 (quoting 2 Trial of Queen Caroline 8 (1821)).
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structure rather than in simply hoping for its replacement. Third, even
if one adopts an alternative approach to legal ethics, such as
conceptions of legal ethics13 calling for (1) a more public-minded role
for lawyers," (2) more independent ethical judgment by lawyers, 5
(3) tailored ethical norms that fit different functional tasks and dispute
resolution processes, 6 or (4) greater sensitivity to institutional and
sociological change within the practice of law (e.g., 'the growth of large
law-firm practice), 7 it is hard to imagine that service to the client will
not remain a central value of legal ethics. Hence, the claim that
discussions of responsibility-taking can be a form of client service
should survive under alternative ethical conceptions. Put differently, if
the claim can be made for sometimes talking about responsibility-
taking with clients within the ethic of zealous advocacy, that claim
13. Most of the conceptions of legal ethics described below have elements of several
of these categories and should not be narrowly "pigeon holed."
14. See, e.g., ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION 2-3 (1993) (envisioning attorneys as "lawyer-statesmen" who embody
"prudence" and "practical wisdom"); WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A
THEORY OF LAWYERS' ETHics 138 (1998) (arguing that a lawyer should act to promote justice,
given the case's particular circumstances); Robert W Gordon, The Independence ofLawyers,
68 B.U. L. REv. 1, 10 (1988) (maintaining professional independence by lawyers not only
better serves clients but has "social and political value going well beyond.. . client service");
William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering 101 HARv. L. REV. 1083, 1088-91 (1988)
(arguing that lawyers should act in ways that promote "justice" or the "underlying [legal]
merits" of the case).
15. See, e.g., LUBAN, supra note 11, at 160 (calling for a "moral activism," whereby a
lawyer tries to "influence the client for the better"); SHAFFER, supra note 12, at 21
(commenting on integrating moral conversations, especially those derived from Christian
ethics, into legal practice); THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS,
CLIENTS, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 26, 44 (1994) (claiming lawyers should discuss moral
issues with the clients and concern themselves with the client's character); David Luban, The
Adversary System Excuse, i THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 7, at 83-85 (critiquing the
ethics of "nonaccountability" of lawyers for their clients' ends); cf GEOFFREY C. HAZARD,
JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 147 (1978) ("A legal advisor should be reticent about
incorporating morals... into his advice....").
16. See, e.g,, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and Professionalism in Non-Adversanial
Lawyering, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 153, 168-69 (1999) (proposing new ethical standards for
lawyers in nonadversarial roles); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute
Resolution: New Issues, No Answers from the Adversary Conception of Lawyers'
Responsibilities, 38 S. TEX. L. REv. 407, 421-48 (1997) (asserting that ethical standards
inherited from the adversarial model are ill-suited to varied ADR processes); Schwartz,
Professionalism, supra note 7, at 679 (stressing that lawyers' ethics should differ in
adversarial and nonadversarial roles).
17. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE
LEGAL PROFESSION 1-3 (2000) (challenging the American Bar Association to incorporate
legal ethics into determining professional responsibilities); ZrrRN & LANGFORD, supa note
11, at 59 (arguing that economic interests, especially in large law firms, have caused lawyers
to lose their moral compass); Rhode, supra note 11, at 591-92 (discussing the need for
considering legal ethics within institutional context).
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should survive, if not be buttressed, under most alternative visions of
lawyering.
Yet before the lawyer's role in fostering denial can be properly
addressed, the position of the injurer (or client) must be understood.
Often discussions of legal ethics, also called professional
responsibility, place the cart before the horse. The analysis typically
begins with a question like, "What are the ethical obligations of an
attorney?" The attorneys, however, are the secondary figures. The
primary players in the drama are the clients. The secondary players are
their agents, the attorneys. Accordingly, the first set of questions to
address are those of client ethics." One might call this realm "client
responsibility" in contrast to "professional responsibility." This Article
addresses a basic question from that realm: "What are the ethical
obligations of a person who injures another?" To answer this question,
let us begin with an example in which the proper response can be seen
not in the affirmative, but in the negative.
I. DENIAL AS MORAL FAILURE
A. Looking in the Mirror
When I was a boy of six or seven, I learned in school to sign-
not print-my name. Enthused by ego and mischief, I decided to do it,
with a crayon all over the wallpaper in a bathroom in our basement!
Now one can see traces of the young criminal mind at work, for what
was noteworthy was howl did it. One of the four walls was composed
of a large mirror. Looking into that mirror, I practiced signing my
name backwards on the other three walls. In perhaps twenty or so
minutes of glee, I had covered the room.
My mother arrived home later that day. She soon discovered the
bizarre, indecipherable markings on the wallpaper. She immediately
called my only sibling, David, and me to the bathroom. "Who did
this?" she demanded. "Not me," I said, "I didn't do it, he did it." "Not
me," he said, "Jonathan did it." My mother stood perplexed for a
minute or so, but then, alas, turned her head toward the mirror. What
had seemed random scribblings took the shape of my name repeated
across the wall.
18. Focusing on lawyers' ethics without first considering client ethics can quickly
lead one astray. Consider partisanship, a principal theme of lawyers' ethics. While it maybe
proper for a lawyer to disregard the interests of people other than her client, that is no basis
for asserting that it is proper for clients to disregard the interests of others.
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Needless to say, I was punished, more specifically, grounded.
"Grounded" was the term that was used, and it was a fitting one at that.
If I recall correctly, my punishment was that, except for school, I was
not allowed to go beyond our yard, including visiting friends' homes,
for two weeks. By restricting the physical ground I could occupy, I
was also given a moral grounding or foundation. The interesting
question is, for what should I have been punished?' 9
Ruining the bathroom wallpaper was certainly a serious offense.
However, the more serious offense was that I lied to my mother about
it. My denial was a moral failure. It hid the truth, breached the family
trust, and put my brother at risk of punishment. Writing on the
wallpaper was a mischievous act, but lying to my mother when
specifically asked raised a much graver issue of character. Time alone
would probably have diminished my impulse to commit small acts of
mischief; whereas, responsibility-taking and honesty are character
traits that one must pursue throughout life.
B. Varieties ofDenial
It is helpful to draw several distinctions when examining denial
and other forms of responsibility avoidance. First, it is worth
distinguishing between two basic meanings of denial.2 ° External
denial involves asserting to another that one is not responsible for
something, as with my statement to my mother that I had not defaced
the wallpaper. External denial is the conscious disavowal of an
allegation. The "denials" of civil procedure pleadings fall squarely
into this category.2 1 While we often think of blameworthy cases of
external denial in which a person who knows he is in fact guilty asserts
his innocence, external denials can also be praiseworthy, as when an
innocent person denies a false charge.
Intrapsychic denial involves a form of cognitive distortion in
which a person's conscious mind is unwilling to face an aspect of
19. Misbehavior, especially children's misbehavior, of course implicates issues other
than punishment. More significant, usually, are identifying the roots of the problem (e.g., the
child's desire for parental attention) and alternative ways of addressing those roots (e.g.,
positive forms of parental attention).
20. Compare Webster's definitions of"denial": (1) an "assertion that an allegation is
false" and (2) "a psychological defense mechanism in which confrontation with a personal
problem or with reality is avoided by denying the existence of the problem or reality?'
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 333 (11 th ed. 2004).
21. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(b); see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 391 (5th ed. 1979) (defining
"denial" as a "traverse in the pleading of one party of an allegation of fact set up by the
other").
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reality, as when a patient diagnosed with a terminal illness acts like
there was no such diagnosis." It is a psychological defense
mechanism, specifically, "an unconscious process whereby painful
thoughts and feelings are repressed."23 Such unconscious denial is a
sibling to other defense mechanisms such as repression, suppression,
and rationalization.24 Grossly put, it involves cognitive distortion,
namely, the unwillingness of the conscious mind to recognize an
aspect of reality for the sake of emotional protection. While much
post-Freudian work in clinical psychology has focused on helping
patients face intrapsychic denial, over the past several decades the
negative air associated with intrapsychic denial has lessened.25 Though
piercing such denial remains a principal goal of much psychiatric
practice, the view of denial is not now wholly negative. Increasingly a
positive aspect of denial has been recognized, specifically, that denial
can sometimes be, "a healthy coping mechanism by which an
individual limits anxiety and maintains self-esteem and a sense of
control ... buffer[ing] an individual from unexpected, shocking news
[and allowing] a person 'to collect himself' and, with time, mobilize
other, less radical defenses.
' 26
Cases certainly exist in which both external denial and
intrapsychic denial are present, as when a child molester who, for
reasons of intrapsychic denial does not see his acts as molestation,
denies a legal charge of molestation. Generally speaking, however,
intrapsychic denial contrasts sharply with the conscious act of external
denial. External denials are usually conscious responses to an existing
22. For a brief introduction and literature references, see Bruce J. Winick, Client
Denial and Resistance in the Advance Directive Context: Reflections on HowAttorneys Can
Identify and Deal with a Psycholegal Soft Spot in PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE:
LAW AS A HELPING PROFESSION 327, 330-33 (Dennis P Stolle et al. eds., 2000). For a more
extensive psychological analysis of intrapsychic denial, see DENIAL: A CLARIFICATION OF
CONCEPTS AND RESEARCH (E.M. Edelstein et al. eds., 1989). See also DANIEL GOLEMAN,
VITAL LIES, SIMPLE TRUTHS: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SELF-DECEPTION 22 (1985) (arguing
denial decreases anxiety but creates psychological "blind spots" at both the individual and
social levels).
23. A CONCISE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF PSYCHIATRY 116 (Denis Leigh et al. eds., 1977);
see also AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC GLOSSARY 57 (Jane E. Edgerton & Robert J. Campbell, III
eds., 7th ed. 1994) (defining "denial" as "[a] defense mechanism, operating unconsciously,
used to resolve emotional conflict and allay anxiety by disavowing thoughts, feelings, wishes,
needs, or external reality factors that are consciously intolerable." (italics omitted)).
24. See IAN GREGORY, FUNDAMENTALS OF PSYCHIATRY 52-56 (1968).
25. See Joel Shanan, The Place of Denial i Adult Development, in DENIAL: A
CLARIFICATION OF CONCEPTS AND RESEARCH 107, 113 (E.L. Edelstein et al. eds., 1989)
("During the last two decades, denial has come to be considered more and more a potentially
adaptive mechanism in situations of extreme, unalterable stress....").
26. Winick, supra note 22, at 331 (internal citation omitted).
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or potential allegation, while intrapsychic denials represent
unconscious operations. This Article focuses on external denial, in
particular the blameworthy sort in which the injurer is either aware, or
if he bothered to investigate would become aware, of having
committed the injury, but nevertheless asserts his innocence. When I
lied to my mother about the crayon markings, I knew full well what I
was doing.
Second, there are many approaches to avoiding responsibility in
addition to explicit denial. In the crayon example, my failure to take
responsibility came in the form of an outright lie. I explicitly denied
having committed an offense that I knew I had committed. Yet often
responsibility avoidance takes more oblique and sophisticated routes.
Some other common forms are obfuscation, delay, loaded processes,
and avoidance and counterattack. Though this Article's central
concern is ordinary civil disputes, some highly publicized disputes
may help quickly illustrate these approaches.
1. Obfuscation
It is hard to think of the Clinton presidency without recalling his
infamous declaration, "I never had sexual relations with that woman." '27
No doubt coached by lawyers, Clinton-a lawyer himself-uttered a
statement which he plausibly could argue was literally true, for under a
very narrow construction "sexual relations" might mean solely
intercourse. However, his statement was deeply misleading. Consider
too his answer before a grand jury when asked if Lewinsky's assertion
in her affidavit that, "there is absolutely no sex between" her and
Clinton was true. Clinton responded, "It depends on what the
definition of 'is' is."28 Often parties speak partial truths to obscure and
mislead. Even if literal construction forms a legal defense to perjury, it
is not a moral defense of that practice.29
2. Delay
Clinton, or his attorneys, may well have expected that, given the
intense scrutiny his statements would receive, obfuscation would
27. Deborah Orin, This Story Keeps Coming Back to Haunt President N.Y. PosT,
Aug. 2, 1998, "News" at 4.
28. Timothy . Burger & William Goldschlag, Lawyers' War of Words: Prez Team to
Senate. Nitpick Not PeDity, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Jan. 21, 1999, at 26.
29. See Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Ethics of Lying in NegotiationS 75 IOWA L. REV.
1219, 1223-24 (1990) (defining lying to include "all means by which one might attempt to
create in some audience a belief at variance with one's own").
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probably fail in the sense of the public accepting the truth of his
statements. Yet his statements may well have succeeded as delays, that
is, as attempts to "weather" the political storm and avoid impeach-
ment. In civil litigation, a similar approach is frequently taken.
Though discovery rules provide that "[p]arties may obtain discovery
regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or
defense of any party,"3 in practice, this rule is often "trumped by
tactics that call for delay, denial, obfuscation, refusal to provide and
even destruction of documents."" Though it is hard to know exactly
what percentage of litigators may be so characterized, legal ethicist
David Boerner states, "Tendentious, narrow, and literal positions with
regard to discovery are ... both typical and expected."32  Consider
Zitrin and Langford's description of "The Lecture" given by a senior
partner. of a 225-lawyer firm to a new litigation associate on how to
respond to discovery requests:
[A]round here, we simply do not give away information. If you can
argue with a straight face that you don't understand exactly what the
other side means when they ask for something, then object: 'It's
ambiguous, it's vague, it's too broad, it's too narrow.' I don't care how
you do it, just get it done. If they can't follow through, too bad. And
don't worry too much about being sanctioned by the court. Our client
will foot the bill for any fine, and most judges won't make it more than
a thousand dollars, anyway.33
Recall too the words of Chief Justice Rehnquist, "Under our adversary
system the role of counsel is not to make sure the truth is ascertained
but to advance his client's cause by any ethical means. Within the
limits of professional propriety, causing delay and sowing confusion
not only are his right but may be his duty.
' 34
3. Loaded Processes
Related to delay is what one might call denial through loaded
processes. Some injurers construct mechanisms which, though
purporting to provide redress, in fact do not. Delay is often an element
of this or, more colloquially, the "runaround." Certain customer
service departments and ombuds offices fall into this category. Are
30. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
31. ZITRIN & LANGFORD, supm note 11, at 56.
32. Id. at 64 (quoting a declaration made by David Boerner).
33. Id. at 54.
34. Waiters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 325 (1985) (quoting
Henry J. Friendly, "Some KndofHeaing', 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1288 (1975)).
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the employees, trained in "active listening" there simply to make you
"feel heard"--to let you vent and thus defuse your anger-or are they
actually working toward effectuating remedial steps?35  The
government too can use such loaded processes. Consider the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo struck between the United States and Mexico in
1848 to transfer conquered territory north of the Rio Grande from
Mexico to the United States. The Treaty provided that "property of
every kind, now belonging to Mexicans ... shall be inviolably
respected.'"36 In theory, former Mexicans living in California were to
maintain their private property rights even though regional sovereignty
had switched.37 The devil, however, was in the details, for the U.S.
government placed on the land owner the burden of proving ownership
and erected significant barriers to such proof." As Ebright writes,
"This procedure transformed land grant owners into claimants who
had to jump through numerous costly hoops before their property
rights under the treaty were recognized. 39 Mechanisms such as these
are often effective. The hope of recovery is offered through a
mechanism which, realistically speaking, turns out to be corrupt or
flawed. Rather than being slain outright, justice dies a slow death by a
thousand cuts. Even if the mechanism does not deceive the injured, it
may assist the injurer in rationalizing, or in representing to the public,
that its actions are just.
At other times, delay is not a factor, but the mechanism purported
to provide justice has simply been "captured" by the injurer or his
allies. Once Klan members could lynch with impunity because they
knew no white jury would convict them of killing a black person. As
Desmond Tutu wrote of the South African judiciary under apartheid,
"[T]he judicial system gained such a notorious reputation in the black
community. It was taken for granted that the judges and magistrates
colluded with the police to produce miscarriages ofjustice.' '40 At times
this capture takes subtler forms. Ifjury awards grow large, defendants
may lobby for laws capping liability. The fullest manifestation of this
35. For an ethical critique of such active listening, see Jonathan R. Cohen, hen
People Are the Means: Negotiating with Respect, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHicS 739, 749-50
(2001).
36. Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement (Treaty of Guadalupe Hildalgo), Feb. 2,
1848, U.S.-Mex., 9 U.S.T. 791, 796.
37. MALCOLM EBRIGHT, LAND GRANTS AND LAWSUITS IN NORTHERN NEw MEXICO
28-29 (1994).
38. Id at 34.
39. Id.
40. DESMOND MPILO TuTu, No FUrURE WITHOUT FORGIvENEss 24(1999).
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may be the doctrine of "sovereign immunity" through which the
government insulates itself against suit.
4
'
The abuse of power often goes hand in hand with the obviation of
the mechanism purported to achieve justice, for such obviation
provides the injurer with what one might call the freedom to injure.
Though morally corrupt, perpetrators of intentional wrongs can
usually calculate accurately. Without the expectation that they would
go unpunished, many would not do what they do. The freedom to
injure says to the injurer: fear not, for when you do commit a wrong,
you can "successfully" deny having done it. To some extent, the
freedom to injure may encourage certain unintentional injuries too.
"Don't worry about acting cavalierly," the unarticulated message may
be, "for should an accident occur, you won't be held liable."
4. Avoidance and Counterattack
A fine example of avoidance and counterattack---of attempting to
dodge the basic issue and blaming the injured--comes from the
dispute between the National Council of Women's Organizations
(NCWO) and the Augusta National Golf Club (Augusta National) over
Augusta National's failure to admit women as members. Augusta
National, located in Augusta, Georgia, is the site of the prestigious
Masters golf tournament. In theory, both men and women may
become members of Augusta National. The club's membership policy
does not have "membership restrictions based on ... gender."'42
However, as of 2002, none of the club's approximately 300 members
were female.43  Even if this did not constitute a legal wrong, most,
though not all, would probably consider it a moral failing.4 (Though
some may offer justifications for single-sex sports and social clubs,
41. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1201,
1201 (2001) ("Sovereign immunity is an anachronistic relic and the entire doctrine should be
eliminated from American law.").
42. Clifton Brown, Augusta Answers Critics on Policy, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2002, at
D4.
43. Id. As of 2002, the club had fewer than ten African-American members. Id.
44. In all likelihood, Augusta National chairman Hootie Johnson did not believe the
club to be acting wrongfully. Similarly, in several of the other examples discussed above
(e.g., lynching by Klan members, the South African judiciary under apartheid, and so on)
injurers undoubtedly believed themselves to be justified. Later, I argue that injurers have a
moral responsibility to take responsibility for injuries for which they believe themselves at
fault, but not ones for which they believe themselves innocent. See infia Part IVB.3. Hence,
I use such examples to illustrate some of the disputed dynamics of denial. Though Johnson
likely does not believe himself wrong, his response is nevertheless a denial in response to a
charge of wrongdoing.
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Augusta National's own policy rejected that position.) In June 2002,
NCWO chairwoman Martha Burk sent a private letter to Augusta
National chairman Hootie Johnson urging the club to review its
membership practices. Wrote Burk, "We know that Augusta and the
sponsors of the Masters do not want to be viewed as entities that
tolerate discrimination against any group, including women [and we]
urge [you] to review your policies and practices ... so this is not an
issue when the tournament is staged next year."'45 Rather than
attempting to refute the substance of Burk's charge (how, after all,
could that be refuted?), Johnson counterattacked. 46 He issued a public
response, calling Burk's letter "offensive and coercive" and stating,
"We will not be bullied, threatened or intimidated .... We do not
intend to become a trophy in their display case.... There may well
come a day when women will be invited to join our membership, but
that timetable will be ours and not at the point of a bayonet" 7
Four points are worth noting. First, Johnson's response largely
avoids any discussion of the critical charge in Burk's letter, namely, the
failure of the club to have any women members. Rather Johnson
attempts to change the subject and focus on the NCWO's behavior.
Second, Johnson's counterattack contains a high level of projection.
Johnson describes the NCWO as a threatening bully, seeking to make
Augusta National a "trophy in their [NCWO's] display case" at the
"point of a bayonet," while the reverse is true-Johnson acts like a
threatening bully." Rather than seeing the club at fault, Johnson
projects fault onto the NCWO.49 Third, one might expect that such
projection would produce an escalation of conflict, which it did. Burk
later responded to Johnson's statements:
I was surprised that Hootie Johnson reacted so strongly .... He
obviously went ballistic. I thought the club was already leaning in the
direction of adding women, and I thought that this could be a quiet
45. Glenn Sheeley, Push by Women Irks Augusta National, ATLANTA J.-CONST., July
10, 2002, at Cl (quoting Martha Burke's June 12, 2002, letter to the chairman of Augusta
National).
46. Id. By describing Johnson's response as a "counterattack," I do not mean to
imply that Burk's initial letter was an "attack."
47. Id. (quoting Johnson's response to Martha Burke's letter).
48. Id
49. Unlike the crayon example where I blamed my brother, the projection here is not
a specific attribution of fault. Rather, it is a more general blaming of the NCWO. Johnson
cannot blame the NCWO for the absence of women at the club. He can only blame them for
raising the issue. Note that Johnson's competitive war and sports terminology, not unrelated
to the tournament's tradition, reflect such projection.
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discussion. Obviously, maybe we will have to consider some other
avenues, perhaps some of those that Hootie Johnson suggested. °
Fourth, is what one might call the denial mindset." This is the mental
orientation of believing that one need not take responsibility when one
injures another. It is reinforced, of course, by the freedom to injure.
There is an interesting question here of the interaction between
social status and the denial mindset. Regardless of one's social status,
taking responsibility for an injury one has committed is a humbling
and difficult step, for it involves admitting one's mistakes or failings.
That said, I suspect that those with higher social status-and the
members of Augusta National are certainly a privileged group-
typically are more accustomed to the denial mindset than those with
lower social status because, as a group, they possess far greater
freedom to injure. Accordingly, while psychologically healthful to all,
taking responsibility when one knows one is at fault may be
particularly healthful, though perhaps behaviorally atypical and
difficult, for the privileged." Augusta National is a country club
whose members are extremely wealthy, entirely male, and
overwhelmingly white." The tournament's name, the "Masters," is
telling. While "Masters" can be understood in the sense of mastery or
skill at golf, white "Masters" of course ruled black slaves, and male
"Masters" lorded over their wives. These negative connotations may
50. Brown, supra note 42. The ultimate fate of the protest has yet to be determined,
but it seems to have significantly "fizzled*" Several months after the matter became public,
Augusta National unilaterally announced that it would drop its corporate sponsorship for the
upcoming 2003 tournament. See Ken Ellingwood & Thomas Bonk, Everyones Taling
About the Mastes -Except in Augusta, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2002, at A16. In December, a
prominent club member, former CBS chief executive Thomas H. Wyman, resigned in protest
of the club policy. Bill Pennington, Former Top Executive at CBS Resigns from Augusta,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2002, at D1. Despite much advance media coverage, a protest organized
by NCOW at the 2003 tournament drew only about forty protestors, and the tournament
proceeded relatively uneventfully. See Dave Anderson, Can Sorenstam, at Center Stage,
Inspire a Mixed US. Open9 N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2003, § 8, at 11 (comparing the efforts of
Annika Sorenstam and Martha Burke).
51. See TuTu, supra note 40, at 83, 253, 269 (discussing the "denial mode" in
apartheid South Africa).
52. Financially, however, taking responsibility will usually be easier for the
privileged.
53. See Brown, supra note 42, (reporting that as of 2002, fewer than ten, or
approximately 3%, of Augusta National's roughly 300 members were African-American). By
contrast, the 2000 Census found that, in the State of Georgia, almost 29% of the population
was African-American. See U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, State Rankings-
Stai&scal Abstract of the United States, at http://www.census.gov/statab/ranks/rank06.html
(last modified June 23, 2003) (citing U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2002 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES, RESIDENT POPULATION BY RACE AND STATE: 2000, at 26 tbl. 22)).
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often be "lost" on white males, but the double entendres are far more
likely to be noticed by people of color and women. 4 Observe too the
issues of status and control raised by Johnson's statement, "There may
well come a day when women will be invited to join our membership,
but that timetable will be ours and not at the point of a bayonet."55
Later I shall discuss further this denial mindset, but this history of
masters and slaves is useful in highlighting a general aspect of it.
Unlike slaves, masters, of course, possessed the freedom to injure. The
master could commit primary wrongs such as selling, beating, or
abusing slaves, and the (society of) master(s) could deny redress for
the primary wrong. There is an important general lesson here.
Theoretically speaking, denial is a possible strategy for both the
powerful and the powerless. In practice, however, it is usually quite
asymmetrical, that is, it is only an effective strategy for the powerful.
The utility of denial often rests on the denier's power relative to the
injured." The freedom to injure is not randomly distributed.
5. Other Forms of Avoiding Responsibility
The above approaches (obfuscation, delay, loaded processes, and
avoidance and counterattack) by no means exhaust the possible ways
an injurer can avoid taking responsibility. Perhaps the injurer will
respond with silence and seek refuge in the thought that failing to take
responsibility is a different matter from explicitly denying
responsibility. 7 Perhaps one has the power to suppress the question of
one's accountability from even being posed.58 Perhaps one can destroy
54. See Sharon E. Rush, Emotional Segregation: Huckleberry Finn in the Modem
Classroom, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 305, 305-06 (2003) (noting an African-American's
"muffled rage" upon reading Huckleberry Finn as compared to Ernest Hemingway's
appreciation and joy). As with other language that emotionally segregates, the dominant
group may pay little attention to the impact of such language on the subordinated group(s).
Such terms are like a coded language the dominant group can use to send negative messages
to the subordinated group without having to admit to themselves that such is their purpose,
for such is not likely their conscious purpose, but perhaps an unconscious one. See id. at
305-07 (discussing emotional segregation); see also Charles R. Lawrence, 11I, The 14 the
Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317,
319-28 (1987) (discussing the unconscious workings of racism).
55. Sheeley, supm note 45 (quoting Hootie Johnson) (emphasis added).
56. I thank Berta Hernindez-Truyol for this point.
57. Though this distinction is not entirely without merit (think, for example, of the
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination), injurers should take care not to give it too
much weight. Unlike explicit denial, silence does not involve telling an overt lie. However,
when an injurer knows he is at fault, silence does represent the moral failure of not taking
responsibility.
58. Consider, for example, a 1989 House Bill introduced, and subsequently
reintroduced each year, by U.S. Representative John Conyers to establish a commission to
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the physical evidence, or, better yet, prevent records of one's activities
from ever being generated. The ways of avoiding responsibility are
manifold. One might hypothesize that the more sophisticated or
powerful a party is, the greater the mechanisms for avoiding
responsibility at the party's disposal. As a child, I told a bold and risky
lie about the crayon marks. Powerful parties usually use subtler
approaches.
IHl. THE ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS OF INJURERS
How should a person respond to having injured, or possibly
having injured, another? Consider the two basic categories of cases:
(1) the person (correctly) knows that he is at fault and (2) the person is
unsure of whether or to what extent he is at fault (e.g., the injurer lacks
sufficient facts to determine fault, the injurer believes the injured party
may have contributed to the injury, the applicable law is ambiguous,
and so forth.) Other categories certainly exist, such as the person who
is fully but errantly convinced of his fault. However, many, if not
most, cases fit within these two basic ones.
Before discussing these two categories further, it may be helpful
to mention three related topics. First, most of the discussion will focus
on the more typical case in which legal and moral fault overlap, though
occasionally I will discuss examples of moral fault (e.g., the crayon
example) without legal fault. Second, asserting that a person is at fault
is quite different from claiming that such fault can be proven in court.
Even if there is insufficient evidence to convict them, both the thief
who robs intentionally and the driver who injures negligently have
committed moral and legal violations. Third, while the discussion
below will focus on injuries committed by individual human persons,
the discussion is also relevant to "legal persons" such as corporations,
organizations, or governmental entities. However, while parallels exist,
judgment is needed in assessing these different domains.59
study the issue of slavery reparations for African-Americans. See Memorandum from U.S.
Representative John Conyers, Jr., to his constituents, Major Issues-Reparations: The
Commission to Study Reparations Proposals for Afican-Americans Act, available at
http://www.house.gov/conyers/news-reparations.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2005). As Randall
Robinson wrote, "The bill, which does not ask for reparations for the descendants of slaves
but merely a commission to study the effects of slavery ... has never made it out of
committee." RANDALL ROBINSON, THE DEBT: WHAT AMERICA OWES TO BLACKS 201 (2000).
59. For example, I argue below that a person-an individual human being-who
injures another but fails to take responsibility risks psychological and spiritual harm.
Analogies exist to the corporate setting, but differences do too. It would seem odd to assert
that an organization that fails to take responsibility for injuries it commits risks
"psychological and spiritual harm." Rather, such denial may put the employees, directors, or
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Lawyers commonly assume that most injuries are of the second
type, complex and ambiguous cases in which fault cannot be easily
established. Perhaps this assumption comes from a sample-selection
bias of focusing on the complex cases that do go to trial. Perhaps this
assumption is rooted in a warranted skepticism developed from
hearing clients tell self-serving accounts, making the lawyer cautious
that she has heard only half the story. Perhaps this assumption is born
in the study of complex appellate case law which forms the foundation
of legal education. Perhaps this assumption is simply a means of
rationalizing zealous advocacy based upon the (mistaken) belief that
the ambiguities of fault fully absolve a person of the need for
responsibility-taking. ° Whatever the source, lawyers commonly dwell
on the second category and minimize the first category of cases. This
is a mistake. Often injurers do know that they are at fault for what they
have done. This is true of most intentional injuries and many
unintentional injuries as well. Accordingly, I will begin by discussing
the first category.6 As we shall see, not only is understanding this first
category analytically foundational, it is also nontrivial.
What shouldan injurer who knows he is at fault do? The injurer
should take responsibility for the harmful act and its consequences of
his own initfative. Ordinarily, the injurer should begin by
apologizing. 62 Next, the parties should discuss what further remedial
steps might be appropriate. In the crayon example, I might have
volunteered to try to scrub the crayon off the walls, have my allowance
withheld to pay for new wallpaper, or do extra chores around the
house. I might even have volunteered to undergo a punishment such
as being grounded. In other words, I should have offered to take
responsibility.
Monetary payment through withholding my allowance may have
been a piece of that response, but other possible responses might have
been as important, if not more important, to my mother. As
mentioned, she punished me by grounding me. She also might have
wanted me to make a restorative attempt at scrubbing the wallpaper or
owners of the corporation, or even the corporation itself, in moral breach and trigger a loss of
corporate morale. On moral responsibility within organizations, see David Luban, Moral
Responsibility in the Age of Bureaucracy, 90 MICH. L. REv. 2348, 2354-55 (1992), in which
the authors emphasize the risk of moral fragmentation within organizations and ethical
responsibility at the level of organizational design.
60. See infia text accompanying notes 197-198.
61. Regarding the second category, see inlfa Part IVIB.3.
62. See Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1009,
1012, 1021 (1999).
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to undergo an educational process like writing an essay showing that I
understood the wrongfulness of my act. Without belittling the
significance of monetary compensation, injured parties often care
about factors other than monetary compensation. The ordinary, one-
size-fits-all legal remedy of monetary compensation cannot be
presumed. Ideally, the injurer should propose a variety of remedial
options to the injured party. The injured party might then select among
those options or, alternatively, the parties might then have a discussion
through which an agreed upon course of action is chosen.
This ethical response involves a much more active role for the
injurer in constructing a remedial response than is common. When a
judge or jury make an award, the injurer typically plays no role in
fashioning it. In contrast, when the injurer seeks to take responsibility
of his own initiative, he must think about what he has done and how to
respond to it. While the power to decide whether a proposed remedial
package is acceptable rests, of course, with the injured party, thinking
about possible remedies is likely to be quite therapeutic for the
injurer." If undertaken seriously, it forces the injurer to think
empathetically about the injury he has caused another. When I
misbehaved as a child, one of my mother's favorite questions was,
"What do you think would be an appropriate punishment?" That
question usually made me squirm far more than when a punishment
was simply handed out.
Some may ask, "Does it really matter whether an injurer
volunteers to take responsibility or if he is forced to by an authority?
What difference does it make, for example, if a tortfeasor offers
compensation or if a court forces him to pay compensation?"
Consider the common case in which the essential remedy is not some
creative solution but monetary compensation." Even here, the
63. For a discussion about how judges may promote a defendant's cognitive
rehabilitation by involving the defendant in the sentencing process by allowing him to suggest
possible probation plans, see David B. Wexler, Robes and Rehabilitation: How Judges Can
Help Offenders 'Make Good'" 38 CT. REV., Spring 2001, at 18, 20. See Bibas, supra note 4,
at 1388-1400 (critiquing Alford and nolo contendere pleading practices as antitherapeutic
generally); Jeffrey A. Klotz et al., Cognitive Restructuring Through Law A Therapeutic
Jurisprudence Approach to Sex Offenders and the Plea Process, 15 U. PUGET SouND L. REv.
579, 586 (1992) (critiquing Alfordand nolo contendere pleading practices that may reinforce
denial among sex offenders); David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Criminal
Courts, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv 279, 285 (1993) (same).
64. Nonmonetary factors, such as apologies, may still have an important role to play.
See Cohen, supra note 62, at 1047 ("Perhaps our presumption should be that apology has a
role to play in most cases.").
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difference is vast, for the injured, for society, and especially for the
injurer.
Injured parties benefit greatly when injurers voluntarily assume
responsibility. In cases in which the injurer knows he was at fault but
the evidence is inadequate to prove his fault, the voluntary offer of
compensation can be the difference between recovery and
nonrecovery. Even when the evidence is adequate, courts sometimes
make mistaken judgments. Here too the voluntary offer of
compensation can be the difference between recovery and
nonrecovery. In short, the voluntary offer of compensation eliminates
the risk that the trial verdict will fail to achieve a fundamentally just
outcome." Injured parties benefit in other ways too. When the injurer
volunteers compensation, not only does compensation come much
more quickly, but injured parties can eliminate or reduce their legal
fees. Plaintiffs' lawyers typically receive one third of the trial award as
their contingency fee. When an injurer voluntarily offers fair
compensation, that cost might be eliminated (if a lawyer is not hired)
or reduced. Injured parties may also save themselves the energy and
worry involved in seeking recovery. The relationship with the injurer
is also likely to be restored much faster. Why, after all, should the
injured party choose to resume a relationship with a person who has
injured them but shown no remorse? Many injuries occur in the
context of prior relationships like family, employment, and community.
Failing to apologize and offer to take remedial steps, like
compensation after an injury, adds insult to the primary injury and can
form an impenetrable barrier to restoring a good relationship.66
Society also benefits when injurers voluntarily assume
responsibility. Most apparently, the time of the judge, the jury, and
court personnel need not be expended adjudicating cases.
Responsibility-taking may also reduce the likelihood of future offenses
by the offender.67 More subtly, but quite importantly, responsibility-
taking helps establish a society rooted in morality rather than money,
65. By a fundamentally just outcome, I mean something different from a procedurally
just outcome. Consider the defendant who, despite having committed an offense,
successfully denies his guilt at trial, because the plaintiff has inadequate evidence to prove her
case. If the trial is handled properly, that is, in accordance with the rules of civil procedure,
evidence, etc., the outcome may be said to be procedurally just. However, it is not
fundamentally just, for the injurer will pay no compensation to the injured. See BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1281 (5th ed. 1979) (defining "substantial justice" as "[j]ustice
administered according to the rules of substantive law, notwithstanding errors of procedure").
66. See Cohen, supra note 62, at 1020.
67. See hifa note 169 and accompanying text.
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and in concern for others rather than selfishness. It provides a path for
reintegrating the offender into society.8  Such ethical and
communitarian rationales should not be overlooked.
Failing to take responsibility profoundly-perhaps even more
profoundly-affects the injurer. This is true whether ornotthe injurer
"gets away with it," that is, whether or not an external authority forces
an injurer, for example, to pay compensation. I will discuss first the
case in which the injurer is held accountable and then the case in
which he is not. In both instances, the interwoven moral,
psychological, and economic ramifications of the injurer's failure to
actively take responsibility are profound.
A. When the Injurer Is HeldAccounitable
There is a vast moral difference between taking responsibility on
one's own initiative and being forced by a third party, such as a court,
to pay compensation." The former is true responsibility, the latter
mere accountability. "Mere" accountability is of course not
unimportant. It is essential that those who do not accept responsibility
of their own initiative be held accountable. It is, however, a morally
inferior path for the injurer. As Braithwaite writes, "Passive
responsibility [or accountability] is something we are held to for a past
injustice. Active responsibility is the virtue of taking responsibility for
68. The theme of social reintegration through responsibility-taking is a fundamental
theme within the restorative justice literature. See John Braithwaite & Declan Roche,
Responsibility and Restorative Justice, in RESTORATIVE COMMUNITY JUSTICE: REPAIRING
HARM AND TRANSFORMING COMMUNITIES 63, 63 (Gordon Bazemore & Mara Schiff eds.,
2001) (describing responsibility-taking as fundamental to social restoration); John
Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 38 CRIM. L. BULL. 244, 255-
56 (2002) (same); see also Garvey, supra note 4, at 1804-29 (presenting a communitarian
argument for atonement); John 0. Haley, Victim-Offender Mediation." Lessons from the
Japanese Experience, 12 MEDIATION Q. 233, 233-44 (1995) (discussing responsibility-taking
and social reintegration in Japan). Other commentators have written general communitarian
critiques of adversarial dispute resolution. See, e.g., Robert A. Baruch Bush, Mediation and
Adjudication, Dispute Resolution and Ideology An Imaginary Conversation, 3 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 1, 7 (1989) (defending mediation as compared to adjudication on
communitarian grounds); Shaffer, supra note 11, at 703-12 (presenting a historically
structured critique of that adversarial legal ethics).
69. Other important possibilities exist too. Some injurers volunteer to pay
compensation "in the shadow of the law" knowing that, if they do not do so of their own
initiative, a court will subsequently make them do so. See Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in
the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUDIES 225,
225-27 (1982) (discussing when the threat of trial forces settlement). For simplicity, I focus
on the two basic cases.
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correcting in the future the injustices of the past, for taking active
responsibility for restoration, particularly restoration of relationships.
70
So central is taking responsibility for one's errors to human
morality that it is among the first Biblical lessons.7' After eating the
prohibited fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, Adam
and Eve grow ashamed and seek to hide from God." God then calls to
Adam, "Where art thou?"73 That question, "Where art thou?" is often
understood existentially rather than geographically, for presumably
God knows where Adam is located physically.4 The question being
asked is, "Where are you morally?" True to much human behavior,
Adam fails to accept responsibility directly himself. He instead
blames Eve: "The woman whom thou gavest to be with me, she gave
me of the tree, and I did eat."75 When then asked by God about her
role, Eve, too, passes the buck: "The serpent beguiled me, and I did
eat."76 For those who think in such terms, it is interesting to ask which
should be labeled the "original sin": the disobedience of taking the
forbidden fruit (transgression) or the failure to take responsibility
through blaming another (a form of denial).7" A similar theme is
70. Braithwaite, supra note 68, at 254. Braithwaite describes active responsibility as
a "virtue." Id When one has injured another, I would consider it a moral obligation.
71. See, e.g., Turu, supra note 40, at 82-83 (commenting on the Bible's critique of
denial in the Eden story). For a positive reading of Adam and Eve's behavior, see Harold S.
Kushner, What Really Happened in the Garden ofEden? in How GOOD Do WE HAvE TO BE:
A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF GUILT AND FORGIVENESS 16, 30 (1996) (lauding Adam and Eve's
courage to opt to live in the challenging adult world of moral understanding).
72. Genesis 3:6-8.
73. Id 3:9.
74. The commentary of the eleventh-century French Biblical commentator Rashi on
God's question "Where art thou?" is particularly instructive. I THE PENTATEUCH AND RASHI'S
CoMMENTARY: A LINEAR TRANSLATION INTO ENGLISH 31 (Abraham Ben Isaiah & Benjamin
Sharfman trans., 1949). ("He [God] knew where he was but [He asked where Adam was] to
enter into conversation with him so that he should not be afraid to answer. So [in the case of]
Cain, (Gen. 4.9); He said to him: 'Where is Abel, thy brother?'). Both instances
demonstrate the linkage between transgression and shame, and suggest the need for
sensitivity in entering a dialogue with the shame-ridden offender in a way that has a chance,
though by no means a certitude, of facilitating his acceptance of responsibility. See Cohen,
supra note 3.
75. Genesis 3:12 (emphasis omitted).
76. Id 3:13.
77. The Bible presents God's punishment of Adam as based upon his act of
disobedience, rather than his excuse-making. See id 3:17 ("And unto Adam he said, Because
thou hast hearkened unto the voice of thy wife, and hast eaten of the tree, of which I
commanded thee, saying, Thou shalt not eat of it: cursed is the ground for thy sake; in sorrow
shalt thou eat of it all the days of thy life... "). However, the narrative fact that God, who
presumably knows what they have done, waits until after He hears Adam's and Eve's
explanations for their acts to punish them supports the position that God wants to hear their
voluntary confessions and hence that their denials are also of critical moral relevance.
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echoed in the ensuing story of Cain and Abel. After Cain murdered
Abel, "[God] said unto Cain, Where isAbel thy brother? And [Cain]
said, I know not: Am I my brother's keeper?"78 Here we see both
outright lying and avoidance. If transgression is the henchman, denial
is the fight-hand man.
The moral difference between assuming responsibility on one's
own initiative rather than being forced to by an external authority-
between "acting like a child" and "acting like an adult"--is also a
central component of psychological development. As Piaget
described, a pivotal step in children's moral development is the
internalization of moral norms, namely, learning to do what is right
because it is ight rather than from the fear of external punishment.79
Kohlberg later characterized this as the transition from a premoral level
characterized by "punishment and obedience" to a principled level
based upon the "morality of self-accepted moral principle."'8 Such
self-initiated morality ties deeply to transcending one's ego and
developing a sense of respect for other persons. When one has injured
another, this means actively assuming responsibility rather than merely
being held accountable.
The same holds under a feminist view of moral development, in
particular with regard to the ethic of care articulated by Gilligan.
Noting the oblivion to girls' experiences in Piaget's and Kohlberg's
research (they studied only boys), Gilligan asked whether our
understanding of the development of moral reasoning would change if
both boys and girls were studied." More specifically, she asked
whether the evolution of "justice reasoning" in boys, as described by
Piaget and Kohlberg, painted a full enough picture. 2 Though not
restricting herself to a gender-essentialist view,"3 Gilligan found that
the growth of justice reasoning alone was too narrow an understanding
78. Id 4:9.
79. See JEAN PIAGET ET AL., THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD 402-04 (photo.
reprint 1966) (Marjorie Gabain trans., 1965). Whether those who act justly do so for intrinsic
reasons or out of a fear of sanction is an ancient subject. For one early treatment, see the
parable of Gyges' Ring in PLATO, REPUBLIC 35 (G.M.A. Grube trans., 1992) (suggesting that,
if a "just" person possessed a ring of invisibility that would guarantee that he would never be
caught or punished, he would cease to act justly).
80. LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, 2 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT: THE
NATURE AND VALIDITY OF MORAL STAGES, xxix (1984).
81. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN' S
DEVELOPMENT 18 (1982).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 2.
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of moral development. She explained that an ethic of care, often
associated with women, was also critical:
[The justice perspective works by] judging the conflicting claims of self
and others against a standard of equality or equal respect.... From a
care perspective, the relationship becomes the figure, defining self and
others [and] the self as a moral agent perceives and responds to the
perception of need. The shift in moral perspective is manifest by a
change in the moral question from "What is just?" to "How to
respond? '8
4
Moral consideration thus includes both the ethics of rights and the
ethics of relationships.
When one has harmed another, the path of actively taking
responsibility presents a confluence, though not a complete
coincidence, of the justice-based and care-based responses. The
justice-based response calls for one to internalize the legal norm that
one should pay restitution. The care-based response calls for one to
consider the "relationships and responsibilities" at issue. Surely this
would include a level of caring for the injured party, addressing his
injury-generated needs, and considering how to construct or
reconstruct a good relationship between the people. A care-based
response might include compensation, but need not be limited to it.
For example, apologizing, which is not derived from legal "justice
reasoning," is often critical to reconstructing the relationship and may
play a key role under an ethic of care.86 The general point is that both
the ethic of justice and the ethic of care call for the injurer to actively
take responsibility. In the language of the Psalms, actively taking
responsibility is a place where "[m]ercy and truth are met together;
righteousness and peace have kissed each other."87
This confluence underscores how ethically basic, immediate, and
operationalizable is the process of taking responsibility after one has
injured another. The subjects of ethics and law are commonly
presented in terms of dilemmas, through difficult and ambiguous cases
in which strong arguments exist for conflicting courses of action. In
contrast, taking responsibility when one has injured another is a clear,
simple, and fundamental ethical dictate. One does not need a graduate
84. Carol Gilligan, Moral Orientation and Moral Development, M WOMEN AND
MORAL THEORY 19, 23 (Eva Feder Kittay & Diana T. Meyers eds., 1987).
85. GILLIGAN, supia note 81, at 16-17.
86. See Aviva Orenstein, Apology Excepted- Incorporating a Feminist Analysis into
Evidence Policy Where You WouldLeastExpect14 28 Sw. U. L. REv. 221, 252-53 (1999).
87. Psalms 85:2,10 (emphasis omitted).
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degree to grasp it. The mora]person wants to pay for the damages he
has caused: the possible economic benefit of denial is not a benefit
that he would want. Further, I suspect that, as an ideal, responsibility-
taking fits most ethical and religious systems and applies in widely-
varying cultures." To understand this, consider the prior principle of
not harming others from which the obligation to take responsibility
when one has harmed another is derived.
The negative moral principle of refraining from harming others
("negative" for it prescribes what one should not do) is a, if not the,
foundational tenet of many ethical and religious systems. It is found,
for example, in the core emphases on the Golden Rule within
Judaism,"9 Christianity, Hinduism," and Confucianism92 and is taught
in many other religious traditions too.93 For philosophers, refraining
from harming others is fully consonant with Kant's categorical
88. This is not to say that those who proclaim this ideal always follow it in practice.
Think, for example, of the history of U.S. slavery. Despite the Judeo-Christian backdrop of
the Golden Rule, reality could not have been more at odds with that ideal. The real test of a
religious system is not the degree to which such ideals are proclaimed, but the degree to
which they are actually achieved. See Steven J. Sandage et al., Seeking Forgiveness:
Theoretical Context and an Intial Empirical Study, 28 J. PSYCHOL. & THEOLOGY 21, 26, 28
(2000) (finding no significant correlation between religiosity, e.g., the frequency of church
attendance, and responsibility-taking).
89. THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD 50 (Michael L. Rodkinson ed. & trans., 2d ed. 1918).
When asked to summarize the Torah, Rabbi Hillel answered, "What is hateful to thee, do not
unto thy fellow; this is the whole law. All the rest is a commentary to this law; go and learn
it." Id.
90. See Matthew 22:39-40. When asked which was the greatest of the
commandments, Jesus responded first to love God and second, "Thou shalt love thy
neighbour as thyself. On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets." Id.
As in the book of Leviticus 19:18, Jesus articulates the Golden Rule in "positive" terms,
prescribing what one should do rather than cautioning against what one should not do.
Nevertheless, the "negative" concept of refraining from harming others is undoubtedly
implicit within it.
91. See THE MAHABHARATA OF KRISHNA-SwAIPAYANA VYASA 13:235 (Kisari Mohan
Ganguli trans., 1883-96) ("One should never do that to another which one regards as
injurious to one's own self This, in brief, is the rule of Righteousness.").
92. When asked if there was a single word that could serve as a principle of conduct
for life, Confucius replied, "Is not RECIPROCITY such a word?-what you do not yourself
desire, do not put before others." THE CONFUCIAN ANALECTS 175-76 (William Jennings
trans., 1895).
93. For example, the Golden Rule is also taught within Buddhism: "[H]urt not others
with what pains yourself." UDANA VARGA: A COLLECTION OF VERSES FROM THE BUDDHIST
CANON 27 (W Woodville Rockhill trans., 1883)); Islam: "No one of you is a believer until he
desires for his brother that which he desires for himself." SUNNAH; and Taoism: "Regard
your neighbor's gain as your own gain, and regard your neighbor's loss as your own loss?'
T'Ai SHANG KAN YING P'EN: TREATISE OF THE EXALTED ONE ON RESPONSE AND RETRIBUTION
53 (Teitaro Sazuki & Paul Carus trans., Paul Carus ed., 1950). See genermlly H.T.D. ROST,
THE GOLDEN RULE: A UNIVERSAL ETHIC (1986) (exploring in depth the Golden Rule in
various religions and cultures).
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imperative, and is quite compatible with utilitarianism as well. 95 One
might think, too, of the physician's credo commonly associated with,
but not actually found within, the Hippocratic Oath, "First, do no
harm.
' 96
Difficult boundary questions can of course be raised about the
limits of the "no harm" principle. Would self-defense justify harming
another? What if by harming another one could prevent some greater
harm from taking place? Important realist criticisms can also be raised
as to whether those who espouse such tenets in theory actually adhere
to them in practice. To what extent do different religions lead their
members to follow the Golden Rule vis-A-vis their coreligionists while
turning a blind eye toward harms committed against members of other
religions or certain members, such as women, of their own group?
However, such issues, significant as they are, should not lead one to
think that the tenet of "no harm" is ambiguous or inapplicable in most
circumstances. To the contrary, refraining from harming others has
withstood history's test as among the most basic of moral ideals.
Observe the linkage here between the cross-cultural robustness of
the principle of refraining from harming others and another cross-
culturally robust principle: the need to respect the fundamental dignity
of people.97  As Piaget wrote, "[A]uthors of the most diverse
inspirations find themselves in agreement on one point ... [the]
sentiment most characteristic of moral life is the feeling of 'respect."' 98
94. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 30 (James
W Ellington trans., Hackett, 3d ed. 1993) (1785) ("[T]here is only one categorical imperative
and it is this: Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it
should become a universal law.").
95. See AMARTYA SEN, ON ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 30 (1987) (referencing the "sum
total" of utility, rather than just one person's). Ethical utilitarians would, ceteis paribus,
generally resist harming others, as harming others decreases their utility. Rule utilitarians
would most likely follow that approach. For some act utilitarians, the matter is more complex
in the perverse case in which the injurer would derive more joy in seeing the injured suffer
than the injured derives pain from suffering. For references to this literature, see generally
Amartya Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioml Foundations of Economic
Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. A. 317, 317-22 (1977) and SEN, supra, at 30-31, 38-40.
96. For the text of the oath, see LUDWIG EDELSTEIN, THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH: TEXT,
TRANSLATION AND INTERPRETATION 3 (Henry E. Sigerist ed., 1943).
97. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER pmbl. ("We the peoples of the United Nations ...
reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human
person...."); The UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights Preamble, G.A. Res. 217 (III)(A),
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 183d plen. mtg. at 135, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) (" Whereas
recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of
the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world....").
98. JEAN PIAGET, SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES 169 (Leslie Smith ed., Terrance Brown et al.
trans., 1995).
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Elsewhere I have suggested that, as persons, people are individuals
with fundamental dignity deserving of respect.99 Just as the ideal of
refraining from harming others is deeply and robustly cross-cultural,
so too is the concept of the dignity of the person and the need to
respect it. The linkage between these two concepts is not accidental: if
other people are beings with fundamental dignity who deserve respect,
one should refrain from harming them.
If refraining from harming others because of their inherent
human dignity is a foundational ethical axiom, taking responsibility
when one has harmed another is its most basic corollary °00 The
passive form of responsibility-taking-accountability-through which
courts or other authorities force injurers to make restitution is of course
a basic part of most legal systems. Yet the call for active
responsibility-taking by injurers also has deep cultural roots, and
current support too,10' particularly, though not exclusively, within
religious thought.0 2 Within both Judaism and Christianity, the view
(though certainly not the only view in these rich religious traditions) is
nearly two thousand years old that before an injurer will receive divine
forgiveness, he should first reconcile himself with the injured.
Regarding Judaism, consider the Mishnaic description (circa 200 CE)
of the Jewish Day of Atonement, Yom Kippur, "For transgressions
done between man and the Omnipresent, the Day of Atonement
atones. For transgressions between man and man, the Day of
Atonement atones, only if the man will regain the good will of his
99. See Cohen, supra note 35, at 760, 768.
100. See CAROL A. HEIMER & LISA R. STAFFEN, FOR THE SAKE OF THE CHILDREN: THE
SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF RESPONSIBILITY IN THiE HOSPrrAL AND THE HOME 369 (1998) ("It is
the humanity of other people that inspires responsibility."); MIKE HEPWORTH & BRYAN S.
TURNER, CONFESSION: STUDIES IN DEVIANCE AND RELIGION 72 (1982). As Hepworth and
Turner state:
The universality of confession would thus appear to hinge on the universality of the
concept of pollution as the infringement of sacred norms. These violations of
taboo produce contagion which can only be removed by rites of purification,
especially public confession, by which the individual is returned to society and the
existence of the group preserved.
Id
101. For example, Robert F Cochran, Jr., reports interviewing five Los Angeles
Christian and Islamic clergy members and finding that "all would encourage those who had
committed a crime to confess to the victim and to the government authorities." Cochran,
supa note 4, at 366 n.290.
102. See generally HEPWORTH & TURNER, supfa note 100, at 16-38 (presenting a
sociological examination of confessions within institutionalized contexts, such as criminal
investigations and church rituals).
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friend."' °3 A similar view is echoed in the Christian Gospel of
Matthew, "Therefore if thou bring thy gift to the altar, and there
rememberest that thy brother hath ought against thee; Leave there thy
gift before the altar, and go thy way; first be reconciled to thy brother,
and then come and offer thy gift."'04
The requirement of Jewish law that the injurer's atonement
should include offering compensation was later most clearly
articulated by the twelfth-century philosopher/physician Moses
Maimonides"' In Christian thought, we see it in systems of private
penance introduced in Europe after the fifth century. Though clergy
were instrumental in the confessional process and the selection of
penance, "the penitential system rested ultimately on the consent of the
individual offender to confess and to do penance."'' 6 Penance could
include not only ritual elements, but also compensating victims and
their relatives through work, payment of medical expenses, or
returning property.0 7  Often the religious and the secular were
interwoven.' 8 As the Anglo-Saxon King Ethelred proclaimed: "[H]e
who henceforth in any way violates right laws of God or man, let him
expiate zealously ... as well through divine penance as through
worldly correction."'0 9
The root philosophy behind such religious atonement was often
medicinal: the injurer, or his soul, would be healed through such
atonement.l°  Note, however, that healing through such active
103. THE MISHNAH: A NEW TRANSLATION 279 (Jacob Neusner trans., 1988). This
view remains within Judaism to this day and is a cornerstone of the Yom Kippur liturgy. See
HIGH HOLIDAY PRAYER BOOK 206 (photo. reprint 1954) (Rabbi Morris Silverman ed., 1951);
GATES OF REPENTANCE: THE NEW UNION PRAYER BOOK FOR THE DAYS OF AWE 251 (Chaim
Stern ed., 1978).
104. Matthew 5:23-24; see Cochran, supra note 4, at 366 n.290 (writing that the
Christian tradition places a great emphasis on confession); see also HEPWORTH & TURNER,
supra note 100, at 8-12 (discussing the link between conscience and confession in
Christianity). See generally DAVID BELGuM, GUILT: WHERE RELIGION AND PSYCHOLOGY
MEET 142-44 (1963) (advocating a more "functional ministry" in Christianity through the
combination of religion and psychology, especially when guilt is the crucial element behind
suffering).
105. See Elliot N. Dorff, The Elements of Forgiveness: A Jewish Approach, in
DIMENSIONS OF FORGIVENESS: PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH & THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES
29, 38-39, 42, 44 (Everett L. Worthington, Jr., ed., 1998) (discussing Maimonides' laws of
return).
106. HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN
LEGAL TRADITION 69-70 (1983).
107. Id. at 70.
108. Id at 73.
109. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
110. Id at 71; HEPWORTH & TURNER, supra note 100, at 43; James 5:16 ("Confess
your faults one to another, and pray one for another, that ye may be healed."); Psalms 32:3-4
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responsibility-taking can extend beyond the injurer. The injured party,
and more generally the community too, can be healed through such a
step, and, equally importantly, escalations of conflict can be avoided."'
Hence, it is not surprising that the ideal of active responsibility-taking
by injurers also has strong roots derived not from the religious or
moral quest of the injurer but from the need to maintain social peace or
order. In the West, medieval German (non-Christian) folk law, which
was constructed primarily to help prevent and control blood feuds,
emphasized negotiated settlements and "concepts of atonement and
reconciliation drawn from the penitential" realm."2 In some more
collectivist Eastern countries, like Japan, with their stress on respect
and social order, such a cultural emphasis on proactive responsibility-
taking continues to this day."3
Another way to express this is to recognize the difference
between causal fault and reactive fault." 4  Causal fault asks who
caused the injury."' Reactive fault asks how the parties responded to
the injury"16 The former addresses what the parties did before the
injury occurred, the latter what they did afterward. The problem with
"hit-and-run" driving is not just the colliding, which is usually
unintentional, but with the fleeing, which is usually intentional."7
("When I kept silence [and did not confess], my bones waxed old ... my moisture is turned
into the drought of summer."). Such medicinal language resonates with the therapeutic
jurisprudence and restorative justice movements we see today.
111. See generally Braithwaite, supra note 68, at 246 (stating that responsibility-taking
can help other "stakeholders"); Garvey, supra note 4, at 1827 (arguing that the actual harm
caused by a crime is immaterial to whether the offender must do penance, but is material to
the reparations the offender must make).
112. BERMAN, supr note 106, at 72-74.
113. Commentators have focused on the significance of apology in Japan. See, e.g.,
Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Arthur Rosett, The Implications of Apology: Law and Culture in
Japan and the United States, 20 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 461, 461-69 (1986) (contrasting the
Japanese embrace of, and American resistance to, apology); see also John 0. Haley, Apology
and Pardon: Learning from Japan, 41 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 842, 842-44 (1998) (similar).
For references to dispute resolution in collectivist cultures generally, see Seiji Takaku et al., A
Cross-Cultural Examination of the Effects of Apology and Perspective Taking on
Forgiveness, 20 J. LANGUAGE & SOC. PSYCHOL. 144, 147 (2001).
114. In large part, this Article is an argument that we in the United States should pay
more attention to reactive fault than we currently do. This is not to assert that we should
overlook causal fault. Causal fault and reactive fault represent different domains. Attention
should be given to each.
115. See Brent Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law. Deterrence,
Retribution, Fault, and Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1141, 1195 (1983) (contrasting reactive
fault with that fault which occurs at the time of the offense).
116. See BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATIONS, CRIME AND
ACCOUNTABiLiTY 48 (1993); Braithwaite & Roche, supra note 68, at 72-74; Fisse, supra note
115, at 1195-1200.
117. Braithwaite & Roche, supra note 68, at 72.
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More generally, different cultures may emphasize different aspects of
fault. As Braithwaite and Roche write, "Western criminal justice
systems (such as that of the United States) are at the causal end of the
continuum; Asian systems (such as that of Japan) tend to be at the
reactive end.'"' 8
Whether the roots be religious, secular, or, as is most common,
some fusion of the two, respecting others implies both refraining from
harming them and actively taking responsibility if one has. The
corollary to "what is harmful to you, do not do to others" is simple: if
you have harmed another, take responsibility for it. "No denial" is the
logical cousin of "no harm." It is a lesson of both morality and social
peace.
B. When the Injurer Is Not HeldAccountable
The risks to the injurer of failing to take responsibility may be
greatest not when an external authority holds him accountable but
when he "gets away with it." Recall the message within the maxim,
"crime never pays": though sometimes crime does yield material
rewards, the criminal (it is hypothesized) will always pay a greater
nonmaterial price. A similar theme is found in the Psalmist's claim, "A
brutish man knoweth not; neither doth a fool understand this. When
the wicked spring as the grass, and when all the workers of iniquity do
flourish; it is that they shall be destroyed for ever... ,,'9 If one
paraphrases "destroyed forever" in less eschatological language,
namely, as "risking lasting psychological and spiritual harm to
themselves," I expect that many would accept that statement.
Now it is notmy intent to defend the "crime never pays" position
as a categorical view, to argue that in every case injurers who are
neither held accountable nor hold themselves responsible pay a
psychological or spiritual price exceeding whatever material benefit
they derive. Not only do the varieties of the human psyche and the
paucity of empirical psychological and (even more so) spiritual
evidence make me wary of attempting to defend such a view, but, most
fundamentally, a categorical defense is unnecessary for the purposes of
this Article.' Instead, the position I will argue is that injurers who fail
118. Id
119. Psalms 92:6-7.
120. A moderate amount of empirical research has examined the psychological effects
of granting forgiveness; however, far less exists on the psychological effects of attempting
atonement. See Sandage et al., supra note 88, at 22 (indicating the lack of empirical research
on seeking, granting, and receiving forgiveness); Bernard Weiner et al., Public Confession
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to take responsibility risk serious psychological and possibly spiritual
harm.
Before continuing, a few words may be in order about my use of
the term "spiritual harm" and the references below and elsewhere in
this Article to spiritual and religious sources, for such language is
atypical within U.S. legal discourse. It is not my expectation or hope
that all readers will share a common view of such matters or accept
differing views as equally legitimate. Take, for example, the view
discussed below that a person who fails to atone for his sins risks
punishment in the afterlife. Though I am a Jew, and though there are
some who argue that a belief in life after death is essential to
Judaism,'"' notwithstanding the peace of mind and motivation to do
what is right many derive from such beliefs, for a variety of reasons
(e.g., the absence of verifiable data,'22 the unwillingness to face death
within our culture,'23 and the of use afterlife beliefs to rationalize
existing social injustices 24), I consider myself a skeptical agnostic
toward claims of afterlife punishment for unrepentant wrongdoers-
and Forgiveness, 59 J. PERSONALITY 281, 283-86 (1991) (critiquing the lack of empirical
research on the psychological effects of attempting atonement); Charlotte vanOyen Witvliet
et al., Please Forgive Me.- Transgressors" Emotions and Physiology During Imagery of
Seekiang Forgiveness and Victim Responses, 21 J. PSYCHOL. & CHRISTIANITY 219, 219 (2002)
(noting a shortage of scientific interest in "blameworthy transgressors); see also Cochran,
supra note 4, at 332 (arguing for a literary approach to studying confession). As one might
expect, because matters of faith are often defined as beginning where scientific proof ends,
empirical spiritual research on this topic is even scarcer.
121. See NEIL GILLMAN, THE DEATH OF DEATH: RESURRECTION AND IMMORTALITY IN
JEWISH THOUGHT 249 (1997) (arguing for a Jewish belief in the afterlife). Note, however, that
the view of life after death is virtually without support in the Hebrew Bible, and dates in
Jewish thought to roughly the second century BCE. Id. at 18. Yet most contemporary Jewish
discourse has much more of a here-and-now focus. As Carol Christ writes, "For many
modem Jews, the question of life after death is not central'" CAROL. P. CHRIST, SHE WHO
CHANGES: RE-IMAGINING THE DIVINE IN THE WORLD 41 (2003).
122. Though I do not expect all claims, especially spiritual claims, to be empirically
verifiable, my caution increases toward those that are not.
123. See ERNEST BECKER, THE DENIAL OF DEATH, at ix-xi (1973).
124. Beliefs in otherworldly reward and punishment can undercut the impetus to
confront injustice in this world. Similarly, beliefs about reincarnation can buttress forms of
social subordination like caste systems. If the lowly station in life into which one was
incarnated is a fairreward for one's behavior in a past life, rather than seeking to overturn the
system of social subordination, one may come to see (wrongly, in my view) that unjust
system as just. It is not uncommon for religious beliefs to be used to justify social
subordination, both within a culture (think of the "divine" right to rulership claimed by many
kings) and of other cultures. See, e.g., Deuteronomy9:1-5 (providing, arguably, a theological
justification for the conquest of Canaan); see also ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN
INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990) (commenting
on the medieval theory of "universal papal jurisdiction" and the "idea of a divinely mandated
war" during the crusades).
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particularly skeptical toward those claims made with exacting
precision. '  Nevertheless, discussions of the risks of wrongdoing to
the human soul or spirit-not just the human psyche-are sufficiently
widespread that I think they deserve serious consideration, both
because of the possibility of their truth and because, even if false, they
undoubtedly inform many people's thinking.2 6 Indeed, to understand
the psyche as fully distinct from the spirit or soul may well be a
mistake."' Let me return now to the main argument.
Denial is an act of moral regression and as such may have
profound psychological and spiritual consequences. Let me first
discuss some of the psychological risks. The most salient include
guilt, shame, diminished self-esteem, negative social feedback, and
narcissism.'28
From Shakespeare's Macbeth to Dostoyevsky's Crime and
Pumishmen the view that unpunished injurers (i.e., the murderers
Macbeth and Raskolnikov) will be tormented by guilt has deep literary
roots. 29  Even if punished, the injurer may still suffer from guilt.
Consider the sentence God imposes on the unrepentant Cain after
Abel's murder: "[A] fugitive and a vagabond shalt thou be in the
earth."'"3  The life of injury without atonement-and for murder
atonement seems near impossible-will be haunted and restless, for to
atone is, as the etymology suggests, to attempt, inter alia, to make
125. For a feminist discussion of afterlife beliefs based upon process philosophy
promulgated by Charles Hartshorne, see CHRIST, supra note 121, at 41-42.
126. See Cohen, supra note 3 (commenting on the lawyer's need for sensitivity when
counseling clients who may hold such religious beliefs about responsibility-taking).
127. Consider Jung's assessment, "Among all my patients in the second half of life...
there has not been one whose problem in the last resort was not that of finding a religious
outlook on life" C.G. JUNG, MODERN MAN IN SEARCH OF A SOUL 264 (WS. Dell & Cary E
Baynes trans., Harcourt, Brace & Co. 2d ed. 1950) (1933).
128. Where an injurer not only passively fails to take responsibility but actively
disclaims or denies responsibility, the psychological risks of lying should also be included.
For discussions of the psychological risks of lying, see SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE
IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 25 (1978) and CHARLES V FORD, LIES! LIES!! LIES!!!: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF DECEIT 276-83 (1996). As reflected in the premise underlying lie detector or
polygraph machines, lying has been found to be a source of physiological stress for some as
well. See generally DAVID C. RASKIN ET AL., VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY OF DETECTION OF
DECEPTION 23 (1978) (finding validity, though not perfect accuracy, in properly administered
testing); OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF POLYGRAPH
TESTING: A RESEARCH REVIEW AND EVALUATION-A TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM, No. OTA-
TM-H-15, at 97 (Nov. 1983) (same).
129. See generally FYODOR DOSTOYEVSKY, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (David McDuff
trans., Viking 1991) (1866); WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH. On Dostoyevsky's treatment
of guilt, see Cochran, supra note 4, at 350-72.
130. Genesis4:12.
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oneself "at one."' 31  The psychological release found through
atonement is a route to "integrity, wholeness, and authenticity.' ' 32 As
Carl Jung wrote, "It is only with the help of confession that I am able
to throw myself into the arms of humanity freed at last from the burden
of moral exile."'
133
When the injurer fails to take responsibility, guilt may soon
translate into a sense of internal shame-the feeling not that one has
committed a wrongful act but that one is oneself defective-and,
ultimately, a loss of self-esteem.' 34  There has been much research
documenting the human psyche's need for self-esteem.' Injurers who
fail to take responsibility put their self-esteem at risk. Numerous
empirical studies have found that people judge injurers who take
responsibility and apologize far better than those who do not.'36 If we
so judge others, then likely at some level we so too judge ourselves
when we fail to make amends. Although empirical psychological
research about atonement is scarce (making the area ripe for research),
one study found that benefits to injurers who take responsibility may
include, "less sad[ness] and ang[er], less guilt about the transgression,
and less shame about themselves."' 37 Consider, too, the Catholic
131. THE OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 754 (2d ed. 1991).
132. SeeCochran, supra note 4, at 364.
133. JUNG, supra note 127, at 35; see ERVING GOFFMAN, RELATIONS IN PUBLIC:
MISCROSTUDIES OF THE PUBLIC ORDER 113 (1972) ("[A]pologies represent a splitting of the
self into a blameworthy part and a part that stands back and sympathizes with the blame
giving, and, by implication, is worthy of being brought back into the fold.").
134. See GABRIELE TAYLOR, PRIDE, SHAME, AND GUILT: EMOTIONS OF SELF-
ASSESSMENT 97 (1985) ("The important feature of guilt is that the thought of the guilty
concentrates on herself as the doer of the deed. Having brought about what is forbidden she
has harmed herself.").
135. See Kennon M. Sheldon et al., What Is Satisfying About Satisfying Events?
Testing 10 Candidate Psychological Need; 80 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 325, 328
(2001) (referencing studies regarding the need for self-esteem).
136. See, e.g., Bruce W Darby & Barry R. Schlenker, Children's Reactions to
Apologies 43 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 742, 747 (1982) (presenting an empirical
study supporting the hypothesis that those who apologize are evaluated more favorably than
those who do not); Ken-ichi Ohbuchi et al., Apology as Aggression Control: Its Role in
Mediating Appraisal of and Response to Harm, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 219,
224 (1989) (presenting an empirical study showing that when a harm-doer apologizes, the
subjects of the study judged the injured person as having a better impression of the harm-
doer); Weiner et al., supra note 120, at 295-96 (presenting an empirical study finding that
confession alters prior opinions about the person offering the confession).
137. Witvliet et al., supra note 120, at 228. Witvliet and her colleagues' study asked
subjects to imagine how seeking forgiveness would affect them; the subjects had not
committed actual offenses. Id. at 223; see Julie J. Exline & Roy E Baumeister, Expressing
Forgiveness and Repentance. Benefits and Barners, n FORGIVENESS: THEORY, RESEARCH,
AND PRACTICE 133, 137-38 (Michael E. McCullough et al. eds., 2000) (describing possible
benefits to seeking forgiveness and related empirical findings).
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priest's traditional response to a penitent's confession: "My brother...
be not ashamed; for thou speakest not unto me, but unto God, before
whom thou standest."'38  Through taking responsibility one may
cleanse oneself-make a "clean breast" as it were--of internal
shame.'39 I note here too the importance of authenticity to one's sense
of well-being. 4
Failing to take responsibility also poses relational risks. Most
obviously, the injured party may become angry with the injurer, and
the relationship may collapse. Such relational damage can in turn be a
form of psychological loss for the injurer. 4' In this regard, guilt and
even internal shame, though unpleasant, can be seen as positive
emotions, symptoms of a well-formed conscience that lead the injurer
to the right course.' 42 More subtle is the risk of increased narcissism.
141
Taking responsibility when one has injured typically involves some
empathy.' 44 In contrast, failing to take responsibility seems likely to
reinforce self-centeredness.
138. BELGUM, supra note 104, at 64 (emphasis added).
139. See, e.g., JUNG, supra note 127, at 36 (emphasizing the "curative results" of
confession). On the language of cleansing and filth, see HEPWORTH & TURNER, supra note
100, at 72, and Martha Grace Duncan, In Slime and Darkness: The Metaphor of Filth in
Criminal Justice, 68 TUL. L. REV. 725, 749 (1994).
140. See Kennon M. Sheldon et al., Trait Self and True Self Cross-Role Variation in
the Big-Five Personality Traits and Its Relations with Psychological Authenticity and
Subjective Well-Being, 73 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1380, 1380 (1997) (investigating
the relationship between authenticity and character traits). See generally Kennon M. Sheldon
& Andrew J. Elliot, Goal Suiving, Need Satisfaction, and Longitudinal Well-Being The
Self-Concordance Model, 76 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 482, 495 (1999) (arguing that
goals must relate to "authentic" values to provide long-term energy).
141. For references, see Exline & Baumeister, supra note 137, at 137.
142. See Roy F Baumeister et al., Personal Narratives About Guilt: Role Action in
Control and Interpersonal Relationships, 17 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 173, 173-74
(1995) (studying the functional usefulness of guilt in restoring relationships); see also
BRAITHWAITE, supra note 4, at 71-75 (discussing the influence of external shame on
conscience on external shame's influence on conscience).
143. See Sandage et al., supra note 88, at 27, 29-30 (concluding that narcissistic
people are less likely to engage in forgiveness-seeking behavior). Sandage and his
colleagues' study does not prove that injuring without taking responsibility increases
narcissism; however, the negative correlation they find between narcissism and atonement is
suggestive. Id.
144. There has been much discussion of the role of empathy in granting forgiveness.
See Michael E. McCullough et al., Interpersonal Forgiving in Close Relationships, 73 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 321, 322 (1997) (arguing theoretically and empirically that
empathy for the offender is the "central facilitative condition leading to forgiveness"); Everett
L. Worthington, Jr., The PyramidModel ofForgiveness: Some Interdisciplinary Speculations
About Unforgiveness and the Promotion of Forgiveness, in DIMENSIONS OF FORGIVENESS:
PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH AND THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 107, 107-08 (Everett L.
Worthington, Jr. ed., 1998) (same); cE Seiji Takaku, The Effects ofApology and Perspective
Taking on Interpersonal Foigiveness: A Dissonance-Attribution Model of Interpersonal
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Many religious writings highlight the spiritual risks of failing to
take responsibility. Consider the claims found in Proverbs: "He that
covereth his sins shall not prosper: but whoso confesseth and
forsaketh them shall have mercy";1 45 Psalms: "I acknowledged my sin
unto thee, and mine iniquity have I not hid. I said, I will confess my
transgressions unto the LORD; and thou forgavest the iniquity of my
sin";' 6 and Acts: "Repent ye therefore, and be converted, that your
sins may be blotted out, when the times of refreshing shall come from
the presence of the Lord.' '4 '  Although such claims focus on
confessions made to God rather than to injured persons, the theme that
injurers who do atone may obtain mercy-and conversely that those
who do not risk punishment-is powerful and echoes as well in secular
views of atonement.14 1 It is beyond the scope of this Article to detail
differing religious views of the consequences to injurers who fail to
take responsibility for their acts. Let me simply state that within some
religious traditions, such injurers, or their souls, are deemed at risk
both in this life and, for those who so believe, in the afterlife. "' For
some, the question of whether to take responsibility after injury
translates into nothing less than a choice between eternal life in
Heaven versus eternal damnation in Hell.
IV SOME OBJECTIONS
A. A Skeptical Response
A skeptic may argue, "But how does one know the injurer harms
himself by denying? Surely he must think he benefits, for if he did
not, why would he do it? You may think denial is immoral, but he may
not care. Try reading less Genesis and more Nietzsche. Not everyone
Forgiveness, 141 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 494, 496-97 (2001) (providing a dissonance-reduction,
rather than empathy-induced, account of forgiveness). It seems likely that empathy plays a
critical role in responsibility-taking too.
145. Proverbs28:13.
146. Psalms32:5.
147. Acts3:19.
148. See, e.g., HEPWORTH & TURNER, supra note 100, at 15 (distinguishing confession
as a "social activity"); REPENTANCE: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 8 (Amitai Etzioni &
David E. Carney eds., 1997) (advocating transporting "repentance from the religious to the
civic realm"); Garvey, supra note 4, at 1810-24.
149. For references and discussions, see BELGUM, supra note 104, at 60-94;
HEPWORTH & TURNER, supra note 100, at 66-84; Garvey, supa note 4, at 1806-10. There is
significant variety in what exactly confession means (e.g., whether it is to be said to the
injured party, to a priest, or privately to God) and what follows such confession in different
religious traditions (e.g., Islam resists granting the clergy the power to absolve the confessor
found within branches of Christianity). See HEPWORTH & TURNER, supra note 100, at 9.
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who injures is--or should be, Nietzsche would claim-burdened with
guilt. 5' Consider too the psychological evidence showing that injurers'
memories tend to mentally "minimize" their offenses'5' and, further,
that over time people actually come to believe the stories they tell.'52
You might also rethink your rose-colored view of confession. It can be
as much an instrument of social control as of inner atonement.'5 3 If the
injurer had your moral sensibilities, he probably would not have
committed the injury in the first place. But having committed the
injury, his approach is likely to be utilitarian.' 4 If he calculates that the
economic benefit of denial outweighs the moral or psychological
costs, or if his decision implicitly reveals that judgment, who are you
to second-guess him?"'55
150. See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS 34, 62, 90, 140
(Walter Kaufman & R.J. Hollingdale trans., Walter Kaufman ed., 1969) (decrying the "slave"
mentality/morality of guilt within the Judeo-Christian heritage). Though their normative
assessment is quite different, without offering an opinion on the matter, I report that
Hepworth and Turner also see distinctive Judeo-Christian aspects to guilt and confession:
Confession ... typically presupposes a constellation of notions about the private
self tormented by guilt and the private conscience exposed to self-criticism. This
constellation is a specific product of Christian history. Of course, it is possible to
trace these Christian assumptions back to a Jewish origin, but their full
development depended on centuries of cultural and institutional development
within a Christian context.
HEPWORTH & TURNER, supra note 100, at 8-9. Further, Hepworth and Turner interpret the
"full development" of Christian assumptions concerning confession as entailing "an
obligation to confess controlled by an official priesthood which alone has the power of
absolution and reconciliation." Id at 9.
151. See Roy E Baumeister et al., Victm and Perpetrator Accounts of Interpersonal
Conflict: Autobiographical Narratives About Anger, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
994, 1001 (1990) ("Perpetrators apparently see the incident as a brief, uncharacteristic
episode that has little or no relation to present circumstances.... This is consistent with the
view that the perpetrator wishes to deconstruct the incident so as to deny any lasting
implications of guilt or shame...."). Conversely, victims tend to mentally "maximize"
incidents. See id. These self-serving memory distortions by perpetrators and victims are of
approximately equal levels. See Arlene M. Stillwell & Roy E Baumeister, The Construction
of Victim and Perpetrator Memories: Accuracy and Distortion in Role-Based Accounts, 23
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1157, 1157 (1997).
152. See E. Tory Higgins & William S. Rholes, "'Saying Is Believing'" Effects of
Message Modfication on Memory and Liking for the Person Describe4 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 363, 363-66 (1978).
153. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 38-39
(Alan Sheridan trans., 1979); HEPWORTH & TURNER, supra note 100, at 15.
154. More technically, I use "utilitarian" here in Sen's sense of a self-welfare goal and
a self-goal choice, but not self-centered welfare. See SEN, supra note 95, at 80.
155. I use the oxymoronic phrase "implicitly reveals" because, I think, most injurers
who seek to avoid paying compensation would not openly admit that they are choosing an
unethical path for the sake of financial profit.
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In part I agree, but mostly I disagree, with the skeptic's response.
I agree with the skeptic that the injurer who fails to take responsibility
implicitly reveals that he values money over morality.56 Yet I disagree
that the moral, and hence psychological, costs of denial are so easily
dismissed, whether or not the injurer pays conscious attention to them.
As discussed above, there are few ethical principles more basic
than refraining from harming others, and few corollaries so clear as
taking responsibility if one does. That such a principle is so basic
highlights the centrality of how one treats others in leading an ethical
life. A person's ethics are most clearly tested when there is something
at stake. If a vendor works in a market where having a reputation for
honesty works to his material benefit, then he need only be self-
interested in a pecuniary sense to act honestly. However, if he sells in a
market where being dishonest can work to his material benefit, then
his ethics are tested.'57  In light of these two factors-the ethical
centrality of interpersonal relations and a key test of one's ethics being
ethical acts contrary to one's pecuniary interests-one's response to
injuring another makes a profound statement about one's values and
character.' 8 Some skepticism toward the skeptic's quick dismissal of
such weighty moral factors is in order.
I also disagree with the skeptic's premise that people always
choose what is in their best interests. There is a longstanding debate in
economic theory as to whether, simply because a person chose a
particular course of action, one can necessarily deduce that their
selection was the best ex ante choice. 5 9 While it is plausible, though
156. See generally SEN, supra note 95, at 1-28 (contrasting economic and ethical
approaches to decision making); Cohen, supra note 35, at 769-83 (critiquing the tendency to
disregard ethical considerations for materialist goals). Some have argued that corporate
executives in particular have a fiduciary duty to their shareholders to disregard supra-legal
ethical considerations that would lead to diminished profits. See Milton Friedman, A
Friedman Doctrine-The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y
TINES, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 32. But cf Amartya Sen, Does Business Ethics
Make Economic Sense?, 3 Bus. ETHICS Q. 45, 45-54 (1993) (critiquing the idea that there is
no need for business ethics). One basic problem with Friedman's view is that the fact of
agency (i.e., that shareholders have hired employees to do their bidding) does not provide a
moral excuse for shareholders to indirectly pursue what would otherwise be unethical
conduct.
157. See Wetlaufer, supa note 29, at 1234. SeegenerallyCohen, supra note 35, at 745
(arguing that how a lawyer sees those with whom he negotiates-whether as objects or
people-is critical to the lawyer's definition of himself).
158. Conversely, one's values and character are critical to one's choice of whether to
deny.
159. Such a premise is sometimes labeled the "weak axiom of revealed preference."
HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 143 (2d ed. 1984). "[R]evealed preference" is a
cornerstone of neoclassical microeconomic theory. Paul A. Samuelson, Consumption Theory
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not indisputable, to think that people usually choose what is best for
them, in some situations surely that presumption breaks down.
Consider the cigarette addict who wishes to quit but succumbs to his
craving for another smoke, or a teenager about to engage in
unprotected sexual intercourse. It seems odd to say the cigarette
addict's "choices" are freely made, for addiction raises serious issues
of self-control. As reflected in efforts and money spent on programs to
stop smoking (why should a person with complete free will pay for
such a program?), the addict himself may even recognize the short-
term versus long-term tension. Stronger drugs like crack cocaine
present the issue of diminished free will even more sharply. To claim
blithely the addict's choices serve his or her best interests seems deeply
unrealistic.' The same applies to the teenager about to engage in
unprotected sex, though there, hormones notwithstanding, general
social and psychological factors (e.g., social pressures, "proving" one's
adulthood, etc.) rather than a chemically induced loss of self-control
are typically at work. Similar to the addict, the teenager may seek
short-term gratification at his or her long-term expense.
In the case of denial, a similar myopia often sets in. Here, the
typical immediate impulse is not sating a chemical addiction or
"proving" one's adulthood, but avoiding shame.'6 ' Taking
responsibility for harming another involves admitting to oneself, to
that other person, and sometimes even to the world that one has erred.
Though such admissions should be seen as signs of psychological
strength, many injurers react differently. When I lied to my mother
about the crayon markings, I was motivated at root by a sense of
embarrassment. Hootie Johnson's fear in the Masters dispute of
in Terms ofRevealed Preference, 15 ECONOMICA 243, 243 (1948). For a fine critique of the
theory of "revealed preference," see AMARTYA SEN, CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT 54
(1982). I suspect many psychologists would find this premise sufficiently unrealistic that
they would not consider it worthy of debate. Observe that whether a choice results expost in
the best outcome is another matter. The issue here is whether, at the time of making the
choice (ex ante), it appeared to be the best one.
160. Compare THOMAS C. SCHELLING, CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE 74-76 (1984)
(discussing the challenge of quitting an addictive smoking habit), with Gary S. Becker &
Kevin M. Murphy, A Theory of Rational Addiction, 96 J. POL. ECON. 675, 675-76 (1988)
(arguing that addictions are "rational," that is what others call "addictive goods" are similar to
other consumption goods). For references on smoking specifically, see Robert Cooter,
Models ofMoraliy in Law andEconomics: Self-Control and Self-Improvement for the "'Bad
Man" of Holmes, 78 B.U. L. REv. 903, 913 n.41 (1998). On such "weakness of the will"
problems generally, see JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND
IRRATIONALITY 45, 52, 67, 86, 173-75 (rev. ed. 1984), and JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND:
STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMiTMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS 10, 21,63 (2000).
161. Here I mean shame in the sense of public shame.
940 [Vol. 79:903
THE IMMORALITY OF DENIAL
becoming a trophy in the NCWO's display case may also reflect an
element of this. Taking responsibility for an injury is a humbling step
and can be a difficult step for many.
Psychological research on loss aversion may also be instructive
here. Both theoretical and empirical literature support the proposition
that many people would rather gamble with the hope of avoiding a
large loss than accept a smaller but certain loss. 62 As Langevoort
summarizes, "Although behavioral decision theory accepts risk-
aversion as a characteristic in the pursuit of gains, it also argues that
risk-seeking behavior is more commonplace when a person perceives
the possibility of loss ' 63 When one has injured another, accepting
responsibility is like taking a certain economic loss, whereas the
outcome of denial is uncertain. Loss aversion may thus reinforce the
shame-avoidant myopia of denial.
Even for those motivated solely by pecuniary interests, the
reflexive response of denial is frequently an inappropriate ex ante
response. Not only can denial increase litigation expenses, but failing
to take responsibility can cause problems to fester and grow. How
much easier it would have been if, early on, the Catholic Church had
squarely faced problems of priests sexually abusing children. Had Bill
Clinton addressed his sex/power addiction when it was raised by Paula
Jones, there may never have been a Monica Lewinsky. As I have
described elsewhere, it cannot be presumed that denying responsibility
is in the injurer's long-term economic interest. 64 Denied injuries can
become like festering wounds, growing and spreading with time.
Conversely, admitting one's errors-and taking responsibility
implies such admission-can be pivotal to avoiding future repetition.
1 65
This is reflected both within popular culture (e.g., the first step to
162. See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory" An Analysis
ofDecision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 263 (1979) (arguing that people underweigh
outcomes that are probabilities as compared to certain outcomes, thus violating the "axioms
of expected utility theory"); Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect,
Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 199-200 (1991) (expounding
upon Kahneman and Tversky's theory of loss-aversion). For further references, see Chris
Guthrie, Panacea or Pandora ! Box" The Costs of Options in Negotiation, 88 IOwA L. REV.
601, 609 (2003).
163. Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law from
Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CAL. L. REV.
627, 637 (1996) (footnote omitted).
164. See Jonathan R. Cohen, Apology and Organizations: Exploring an Example
from Medical Practice, 27 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 1447, 1461-63 (2000) (describing significant
long-run financial savings-$75 million over an eight year period by the Toro Corporation-
after adopting a policy of taking, rather than denying, responsibility for injuries).
165. Seeid. at 1464.
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recovery in twelve-step programs is admitting the problem'66) and in
judicial thought. As one court opined, "It is almost axiomatic that the
first step toward rehabilitation of an offender is the offender's
recognition that he was at fault."' 67  We also see it in the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines' reductions for a defendant who, rather than
contesting the charge, "clearly demonstrates acceptance of
responsibility for his offense.' 6' Empirical studies also suggest a
possible link between responsibility-taking and reduced recidivism.
169
When similar injuries can recur, denial may cause sizable long-term
harm. This is of significance for even the most pecuniarily self-
interested. I would note as well possible reputational benefits (e.g., in
the long run, a company that "stands behind its products" may attract
consumers) and strategic benefits (e.g., assuming responsibility may
166. See, e.g., Alcoholics Anonymous Austl., The Twelve Steps of Alcoholics
Anonymous, available at http://www.alcoholicsanonymous.org.au (last visited Jan. 18, 2005)
("[Step] 1. We admitted we were powerless over alcohol-that our lives had become
unmanageable."). As Peck writes of persons with character disorders, "[N]o problem can be
solved until an individual assumes the responsibility for solving it." M. ScoTT PECK, THE
ROAD LESS TRAVELED: A NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF LOVE, TRADITIONAL VALUES AND SPIRITUAL
GROWTH 39 (1978).
167. SeeGollaher v. United States, 419 E2d 520, 530 (9th Cir. 1969).
168. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3El.1(a) (2001); see id § 3El. cmt.
app. n.1(a) ((l)(a) ("[A] defendant who falsely denies ... relevant conduct that the court
determines to be true has acted in a manner inconsistent with acceptance of
responsibility...."); id. § 3EL.1 cmt. app. n.2 ("This adjustment is not intended to apply to a
defendant who puts the government to its burden of proof at trial by denying the essential
factual elements of guilt, is convicted, and only then admits guilt and expresses remorse.").
169. Further research is needed concerning the linkage between responsibility-taking
and reduced recidivism. See JOHN BRAnTHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND RESPONSIVE
REGULATION (2002) (calling for such research); Allison Morris & Gabrielle Maxwell,
Restorative Conferencing, in RESTORATIVE COMMUNITY JUSTICE: REPAIRING HARM AND
TRANSFORMING COMMUNITIES 173, 186-87 (Gordon Bazemore & Mara Schiff eds., 2001)
(same); see also Friedrich L6sel, The Eicacy of Correctional Treatment: A Review and
Synthesis of Meta-Evaluations, in WHAT WORKS: REDUCING REOFFENDING: GUIDELINES
FROM RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 79, 102-03 (James McGuire ed., 1995) (calling for more
research on how environmental and offender characteristics affect recidivism). However,
there is some empirical research from the restorative justice and victim-offender mediation
literatures offering, as Braithwaite writes, "empirical grounds for optimism" that restorative
justice approaches, which typically involve accepting responsibility, can reduce reoffending.
BRAITHWAITE, supra, at 69. For a recent meta-analysis supportive of that view, see William R.
Nugent et al., Participation h7 Victim-Offender Mediation and the Prevalence and Seveity of
Subsequent Delinquent Behavior A Meta-Analysis, 2003 UTAH L. REv. 137, 161-62.
Nugent and his colleagues argue that when a juvenile has been adjudicated guilty, after
accepting responsibility for the crime or by evidence showing guilt, it is less likely that the
juvenile will engage in the new crimes. Id.; see also L6sel, supra, at 89 (confirming the
positive effect of offender treatment on reduced recidivism). Note that these studies do not
specifically identify the positive impact of responsibility-taking, but, in context, such an
inference seems reasonable.
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"innoculate" the offender against punitive damages) to taking
responsibility.'70
Let me be clear that I am not asserting that in every case
responsibility-taking will be economically beneficial to the injurer. In
many cases, responsibility-taking may well be economically costly.
Indeed, under our system of ordinary compensatory damages,
economically speaking, denial may at times become a nearly "no-lose"
gamble.' 7' Though deeply problematic morally, denial often makes
economic sense. Regardless, I suggest that, in all but extremely
unusual cases, denial is an act of moral regression, and hence poses
significant spiritual and psychological risks to the injurer. In some
cases, particularly when long-term effects are considered, it is likely to
be economically costly as well.
At its core, denying an injury one has caused is a form of lying.
A key problem with lying is its contagious nature. As Sissela Bok
observed:
[S]o few lies are solitary ones. It is easy, a wit observed, to tell a lie, but
hard to tell only one. The first lie "must be thatched with another or it
will rain through." More and more lies may come to be needed; the liar
always has more mending to do.'72
Denial can trigger a similar process. When an organization covers up a
problem, be it an internal one like sexual harassment or an external
one like a defective product, not only does it risk recurrences of that
specific problem, but it may set in motion various dysfunctional
dynamics. Casualties may include open conversations, truth telling,
and corporate morale. The organization may steadily lose its best
workers as employees with integrity may leave and employees who
tolerate cover-ups remain. Conversely, even if daunting at first,
responsibility-taking can ultimately boost corporate morale.' Injurers
should also be aware of the risk of subconscious punishment-seeking:
170. See Cohen, supra note 62, at 1022-23.
171. When the only punishment for denial is paying what was owed (e.g.,
compensatory damages), injurers who are motivated solely by economic factors have a strong
incentive to deny. Assume for the moment that there are no litigation costs. If the denial
"succeeds," the injurer pays nothing, while if it "fails;' he must simply pay what he would
have paid had he admitted his fault. From the economic perspective, denial becomes a no-
lose gamble. When litigation costs are introduced, the picture is made more complex, but the
essential lesson remains: unless the injurer expects the economic costs of denial to outweigh
the economic benefits, pecuniarily motivated injurers will be likely to deny. Given such
factors, our society may wish to consider creating greater economic incentives against denial.
See Cohen, supm note 3.
172. BOK, supm note 128, at 25 (internal citation omitted).
173. SeeCohen, supm note 164, at 1473-75.
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though the injurer (consciously) denies any wrongdoing, his
subconscious mind may seek to satiate his sense of guilt.' 4 What to
the external world may appear to be simple misfortune may in fact be
rooted in a past wrong for which atonement was not made.
Viewed in a positive light, injuries are crises that provide
significant learning opportuniwes for injurers. Such learning may
address matters beyond preventing future recurrences of the problem.
Not only might facing problems of sexual abuse early on have helped
the Catholic Church prevent future cases of abuse, it also might have
prompted it (in theory, at least) to rethink the other subjects such as the
celibacy of priests and the ordination of women. '  Recent space
shuttle disasters could prompt NASA to rethink not only technical
matters of engineering, but also questions of organizational design.76
This applies to individuals as well. Even when the injury appears to be
"one shot" (i.e., the likelihood of a similar future injury is minuscule),
much can be learned by injurers who face what they have done. Take a
minor negligence case like accidentally driving one's car into a
neighbor's mailbox and knocking it over. Taking responsibility by
apologizing and paying for necessary repairs might free up the driver
to ask himself, "What led me to do this?" The response may be
simple, such as identifying a blind spot when using the rearview
mirror, or may point to broader issues, such as the need for stress
reduction in his life. Taking responsibility can be essential to turning
the injury into a learning experience.' This is especially true for cases
174. One might link such a view to Freud. See SIGMUND FREUD, WRITINGS ON ART
AND LITERATURE 234, 245 (1997) ("It is a fact that large groups of criminals want to be
punished. Their super-ego demands it and so saves itself the necessity for inflicting the
punishment itself"). Observe, however, that Freud focused on guilt (rooted in general
psychological impulses like parricide and the Oedipus complex) preceding crime, rather than
on guilt following crime. Sigmund Freud, Ciminails from a Sense of Guil4 in 14 THE
STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 332, 332-
33 (James Strachey ed., 1957). Freud emphasized guilt's thirst for punishment as an impetus
for crime. See id.
175. See Michael Paulson, Crisis in the Churc; Catholics Want Change, Poll Finds
SeekArchbisop Open to New Ideas, BOSTON GLOBE, May 11, 2003, at Al ("A plurality of
local Catholics say the requirement of priestly celibacy is the primary cause of clergy sexual
abuse. An overwhelming 86 percent majority of local Catholics-the highest ever in a Globe
poll-say they would now support allowing priests to marry, and 80 percent, another record
in Globe polling, say they would support the ordination of women as priests.").
176. See Excerpts from Report of the Columbia Accident Investigation Boarg N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 27, 2003, at AI8 ("In the [Columbia Accident Investigation] board's view,
NASA's organizational culture and structure had as much to do with this accident as the
external tank foam").
177. Consider the view of attorney Sloan Bashinsky:
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of intentional injury and cases in which intrapsychic denial
accompanies the external injury. Surely the injurer who wishes to
grow spiritually and psychologically needs to think about whyhe acted
the way he did.
Finally, observe that while responsibility-taking is generally
psychologically and spiritually beneficial to the injurer, such benefits
to the injurer do not form the moral basis for the injurer's obligation to
take responsibility. As mentioned, the duty to take responsibility when
one has wrongfully injured another derives from the duty to refrain
from harming others. It does not derive from the instrumental spiritual
and psychological benefits to the injurer. In terms of the injurer's
ethics, the fact that fulfilling this moral duty can be spiritually,
psychologically, and sometimes even economically beneficial to
oneself is a "bonus." As I discuss elsewhere, this "bonus" turns out to
be quite relevant for a lawyer's ethics, for, given the moral and
psychological risks involved, a lawyer can by no means presume that
the client's interests will be best served by denial.'
B. Three Further Objections
In response to the claim that injurers have a moral duty to actively
take responsibility for harms they cause, some may offer further
objections. Consider three such challenges. First, it may be argued
that if denial after injury is the cultural norm, an injurer who follows
that pattern should not be held blameworthy. Second, given the nature
of the postinjury "game," fairer outcomes will result when injurers
initially deny rather than take responsibility. For example, if "split-the-
difference" forces drive legal settlements, denial may yield fairer
results than offers of responsibility-taking. Third, in many if not most
cases, fault cannot be known in advance of legal proceedings. It is the
legal process that determines the complex and ambiguous questions of
fault. Thus, it is proper for defendants (not injurers--one cannot know
As in medicine, about five percent of legal clients respond well to the traditional
symptomatic treatment: negotiating and court battles. In the other ninety-five
percent of cases, the legal problem-the symptom-may be removed, but the
underlying causes continue to fester and plague clients.... Legal cases, like
illnesses, have deeper causes and resolve more favorably when the underlying
dynamics are explored and worked through before the outer symptoms arm treated
SLOAN BASHINSKY, THE HIGH LEGAL ROAD: A NEW APPROACH To LEGAL PROBLEMS 14
(1990). Bashinsky advertises his services thus: "LAW AND SPIRIT[:] Legal problems
mirror your unlearned spiritual lessons, lessons presented before and missed, lessons to be
presented later if not learned now." Id. at 46.
178. See Cohen, supm note 3.
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who was at fault for the injury until after the trial) to let the legal
process run its course. To take responsibility immediately after the
injury would be premature.
1. Cultural Norms
"What should I do if I cause a car accident? You may say that I
should get out of my car and confess my failings, but my insurance
company tells me to say nothing.'79 The same is true if a doctor
commits a mistake and goes to his hospital's risk management board,
or, more generally, when an injurer goes to his lawyer.8 If denying
responsibility after the injury is the cultural norm, how can I be blamed
for following it?"' 8 '
To see how extensively the amoral view of denial permeates our
thinking, consider the most famous example within game theory: the
"prisoner's dilemma." The presentation of philosopher Robert Nozick
is typical:
[A] sheriff offers each of two imprisoned persons [unable to
communicate and] awaiting trial the following options.... If one
prisoner confesses and the other does not, the first does not go to jail
and the second will receive a twelve-year sentence; if both confess, each
receives a ten-year prison sentence; if both do not confess, each receives
a two-year sentence.'
82
What should a prisoner do? The usual analysis is that, despite the fact
that both prisoners will do better by not confessing, if he is "rational,"
179. See Cohen, supra note 62, at 1012 n.9 ("A friend's insurance company provided
him with a small, wallet-sized card titled, 'What to do when [you are] involved in a car
accident.' The bottom line of the card reads, 'Keep calm, don't argue, accuse anyone, or
admit guilt."'). On the improbable risk of voiding one's insurance coverage by admitting
guilt, see id at 1025-28.
180. See Jonathan R. Cohen, Legislating Apology: The Pros and Cons, 70 U. CIN. L.
REv. 819, 850 n. 101 (2002) (discussing malpractice insurers' typical tactic to instruct a doctor
not to admit fault to a patient).
181. This objection also suggests a reliance-on-professional-advice rationale: if the
professional (e.g., lawyer), who is experienced in such matters, advises the client, who is
inexperienced, to deny, should not the client heed such expert advice even if it contradicts his
commonsense morality? This issue is a serious one, but due to space constraints I will not
pursue it here.
182. ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY 50 (1993). Diagrammatically, the
problem can be represented by a matrix:
_Prsoner 11
Don't Confess Confess
Prisoner I Don't Confess 2, 2 12,0
n Confess 0, 12 10, 10
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each prisoner should confess, for irrespective of the other prisoner's
choice, he will be better off confessing. The lesson or paradox of the
dilemma is that, quite unlike Adam Smith's efficient market,
individualistically rational or self-interested behavior makes both of
the prisoners worse off than had they cooperated by remaining silent 83
Yet observe here the basic moral question that is not asked: Did the
prisoner actually commit the crime? In the usual posing of the
problem, whether the prisoner actually committed the crime is
irrelevant. The decision of whether to confess or deny is seen entirely
as a strategic choice. The sole focus has become that which is
instrumentally useful. Confession and denial have been utterly severed
from actual guilt and innocence. By contrast, the obvious moral
position is that the prisoner should deny having committed the crime if
he did not commit it and confess to the crime if he did commit it.
What is true in the prisoner's dilemma is all too often true in our
culture. Denial has become purely a matter of strategy. The moral
relevance of responsibility-taking has been completely bypassed.
Social norms do have their place in establishing proper behavior;
however, they do not typically make what is wrong right. The fact that
denial after injury is common in our society, and further that it is
legitimated both implicitly through examples like the prisoner's
dilemma and explicitly through professional advice, does not justify
the guilty denier's wrongful act. Why our society legitimates denial
after injury is an interesting question. 84 But whatever the reason, it
does not provide moral excuse. Recall Hume's critique of the
naturalistic fallacy People commonly, but mistakenly, attempt to
justify what should be (the normative) based upon what is (the
positive).'85 Even if denial after injury is the common response, it
remains immoral.
183. Such an individualistic approach to rationality can be challenged. Cannot each
prisoner ask himself, "What should we do?" (and choose not to confess) rather than "What
should I do?" (and choose to confess). Commentators have written about the linkage
between identity and rationality. See AMARTYA SEN, REASON BEFORE IDENTITY: THE
ROMANES LECTURE FOR 1998 1-31 (1999); Jonathan R. Cohen, Reasoning Along Different
Lines. Some Vaned Roles of Rationality in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, 3 HARV
NEGOT. L. REv. 111, 118-20 (1998); Amartya Sen, Goals, Commianent, and Identity, 1 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 341, 348 (1985).
184. For several hypotheses, see Cohen, supra note 3.
185. See generally DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 525 (Ernest C.
Mossner ed., Penguin Classics 1985) (1739 and 1740) (arguing that "the sense of justice and
injustice is not deriv'd from nature;" rather, it arises "from education, and human
conventions").
94720051
TULANE LA WREVIEW
2. Substantive Fairness
Some injurers may assert that, given the "nature of the game,"
fairer results will ensue if they deny, rather 'than admit, responsibility.
"Most lawsuits settle, and 'split-the-difference' is the rule. Suppose I
have committed $100 worth of damages. If I admit to owing $100, but
the other side claims I owe $200, we'll probably settle at $150. That is
$50 more than I owe. However, if I deny responsibility and state that I
owe nothing, and the other side claims $200, we'll settle at $100,
which is fair. The postinjury settlement process is basically a game,
and a fairer outcome will result if I play it like everyone else does. I
personally wouldn't mind being honest, but in a system in which
everyone else lies, being honest would work against me." A criminal
defendant facing severe sanctions might reason analogously. "Look, I
would admit that I stole the nine videotapes worth $150 total, but if I
do I'll be sentenced to fifty years in prison. If that's not cruel and
unusual punishment, I don't know what is." 6 The 'justice' system is
more criminal than my crime. I ought to go to jail for months, not for
a half-century. Given that backdrop, I am right to deny my theft. It's a
lie, but it's the only chance for avoiding a gross injustice."
Such second-best, "dirty hands" claims, in which deontology and
teleology are in tension, must be taken seriously.'87 Indeed, in my view,
such reasoning has much force in the context of the U.S. criminal
justice system, which incarcerates people, disproportionately
minorities, at levels and for durations virtually unheard of throughout
the world.' However, before endorsing such reasoning, a caution
186. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 66, 70 (2003) (rejecting the appellant's
argument that a fifty-year sentence in these circumstances under California's "three strikes"
law violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against "cruel and unusual" punishment).
187. See Michael Walzer, Political Action." The Problem of Dirty Hands, 2 PHiL. &
PUB. AFF. 160, 161-62 (1973) (arguing that "dirty hands" claims should be taken more
seriously in political arenas).
188. MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 19-23 (1999). Commentators have written
about racial and ethnic bias within the U.S. criminal justice system. See generally JUAN
PEREA ET AL., RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA 1018-19
(2000) (pointing out the discrepancy between the abundance of articles discussing African-
Americans and crime and the minimal literature discussing other racial groups and crime);
SAMUEL WALKER ET AL., THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACE, ETHNICITY, AND CRIME IN AMERICA
(1996) (arguing that almost all criminal justice issues in America involve matters of race and
ethnicity). For international statistics, see MAUER, supra, at 19-23 ("In contrast to the
industrialized nations to which the United States is most similar, [as of 1995, American] rates
of incarceration are about 6-10 times higher in general."). As Lawrence Friedman wrote
roughly eight years ago, "[W]e are embarked today on a radical, and dangerous experiment-
an experiment in fighting crime through more and more draconian measures; and through
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should be raised, at least concerning civil cases. This second-best
justification is not based on the position that admitting responsibility
will simply be to the injurer's economic detriment. An offender
wishing to respond morally to injuring wants to pay compensation.
The second-best justification for denial only gains force to the extent
that admission will lead the injurer to have to pay more than what is
properly owed The moral question the injurer faces is not, "will I have
to pay if I admit what I have done?" Rather it is, "will I have to pay
more than I should if I admit what I have done?" In other words, the
issue is whether the injurer uses a moral, rather than an amoral,
reference point.
It is far from clear that admitting what one properly owes is
inevitably disadvantageous vis-A-vis paying what one properly owes.
By making a fair offer of settlement along with his admission of
responsibility, the injurer adopts a reasonable, justifiable bargaining
position to which, absent persuasive argument otherwise, he should
generally adhere.'89 In the language of negotiation analytics, such an
offer is a "principled" position that is likely to carry much force. 9° If
the injured party seeks a greater settlement amount, then it is
appropriate for trial to ensue. However, my sense is that the opposite is
most likely. Usually, the injurer's admission of responsibility coupled
with a fair settlement offer will yield the cessation of hostilities rather
than their escalation.'9' Recall too the requirement under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure that, if damages awarded at trial are less than
the defendant's prior settlement offer, the plaintiff must pay the
mass incarceration." Lawrence M. Friedman, Dead Hands. Past and Present in Criminal
Justice Policy, 27 CUMB. L. REV 903, 920 (1997).
189. This is not to say the injurer should be entirely inflexible, adopting Boulwarism
(i.e., beginning a negotiation with a fair, but fmal, offer) as a negotiating style. See ROBERT
H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND
DISPUTES 215 (2000). Having "room to negotiate" can sometimes help yield agreement. See
Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Opening Offers and Out-of-Court Settlement A Little
Moderation May Not Go a Long Way, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 1, 11-13 (1994)
(suggesting moderate initial offers may produce greater risk of impasse than extreme initial
offers).
190. See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WITHOUT GrVING IN 83 (Bruce Patton ed., 2d ed. 1991) (arguing that problem solvers should
stand in a "principled position" by focusing on a problem's merits).
191. For data reflecting such readiness to settle following the defendant's acceptance
of responsibility and fair compensation offer, see Cohen, supra note 164, at 1453, 1460-62
(describing rapid settlement following such offers). The experience with apology is also
instructive here. As Goldberg and his coauthors describe, "[a]n apology alone is insufficient
to resolve a dispute, but will so reduce tension and ease the relationship between the parties
that the issues separating them are resolved with dispatch." Stephen B. Goldberg et al.,
Saying You're Sorry, 3 NEGOT. J. 221, 221 (1987).
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defendant's costs (e.g., trial expenses) incurred after the settlement
offer. 92  This too provides an incentive for a plaintiff to accept a
reasonable settlement offer and for a defendant making such an offer
to stand firm.
3. Prematurity
The claim that it is premature for an injurer to take responsibility
of his own initiative rather than awaiting a court's determination is a
serious one. No doubt there are many cases in which causal fault is
ambiguous, either from factual ambiguity or ambiguity in the relevant
legal and moral standards, and in which investigations and legal
proceedings should be undertaken before attempting to determine
fault. In many cases, true or false, guilty or not guilty, liable or not
liable, and to what degree, are things we only know, if at all, after a
jury has told us. Recall Johnson and Boswell's famed exchange over
the lawyer's role:
BOSWELL. "But what do you think of supporting a cause which you
know to be bad?" JOHNSON. "Sir, you do not know it to be good or
bad till the Judge determines it.... An argument which does not
convince yourself, may convince the Judge to whom you urge it; and if
it does convince him, why, then, Sir, you are wrong, and he is right. It is
his business to judge; and you are not to be confident in your own
opinion that a cause is bad, but to say all you can for your client, and
then hear the Judge's opinion."'93
Note too that at times moral fault and legal fault diverge. By following
their moral intuitions, some parties may quickly, but wrongly, conclude
that they were at legal fault and take responsibility for that to which
they are not legally obligated. I say this not to criticize such morally
based responses, but to highlight the risk of misinformed choice.
94
Yet the argument against injurers taking responsibility of their
own initiative should not be overstated. Taking Johnson's position to
192. See FED. R. Civ. P. 68 ("If the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more
favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the making of the
offer.").
193. 2 JAMES BOSWELL, THE LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON, L.L.D. AND THE JOURNAL OF
Its TOURTOTTHE HEnRIDES 40 (Henry Marley ed., 1885).
194. Judges and juries often understand that parties' spur-of-the-moment declarations
may overstate their fault. See, e.g., Phinney v. Vinson, 605 A.2d 849, 849 (Vt. 1992) (finding
a physician's fault-admitting apology insufficient to establish a prima facie case of negligence
in a malpractice action); Senesac v. Assocs. in Obstetrics & Gynecology, 449 A.2d 900, 903
(Vt. 1982) (same); see also Peter H. Relrn & Denise R. Beatty, Legal Consequences of
Apologizing, 1996 J. DisP. RESOL. 115, 119-29 (reviewing such case law).
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its logical extreme reveals its limitations. To assert that one should
never take responsibility absent a legal proceeding is absurd. Every
day people take responsibility for injuring others, both within
negotiated legal settlements and, as is far more common, before the
shadow of litigation is even glimpsed. 95  The real question is not
whether it is ever appropriate for injurers to assume responsibility of
their own initiative, but when it is appropriate.
To address this question of "when" consider two basic types of
cases. First are those in which fault is clear (as judged from the
injurer's viewpoint). Second are those in which fault is ambiguous.
Many cases of injury are not complex.'96 Injurers do know that
they are at fault, both legally and morally, for the accident. When one
drives into a parked car, mistakenly administers the wrong medicine,
or (especially) commits an intentional tort like theft, one can be quite
confident that one is at fault. It is, of course, possible that one will be
mistaken in believing oneself at fault. However, often injurers know
the essential facts, and, given those facts, it is obvious, or would
become so upon minimal investigation, that they have committed a
moral and legal breach. This does not mean that one need instantly
admit one's fault, though of course one may. Perhaps one wants first to
talk with a lawyer, either to have an independent "sounding board" or
to verify that what one believes to be a legal breach is in fact a legal
breach.
And what of cases in which either the facts or the applicable
standards are ambiguous? The putative injurer who wants to act
ethically should (1) investigate the facts and moral and legal standards
and then (2) take responsibility to the extent that he believes himself at
fault.'97 One might label these the duty ofinvestigaion and the duty of
proportional responsibility-taking. If one is in doubt about what one
195. Though some lawyers may, to use Mnookin and Kornhauser's phrase, have
difficulty imagining that postinjury actions can exist outside the "shadow of the law," many
do. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaimng in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case for Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 950-52 (1979). Shadows, after all, have edges;
otherwise there is simply darkness.
196. For a variety of reasons, some lawyers may mistakenly believe that such simple
cases do not exist or are exceedingly rare. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61. Some
empirical evidence does exist to cast doubt on that view. See, e.g., William L.E Felstiner et
al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Caiming .... 15
LAW & Soc'¥ REv. 631, 642-43 (1980-81) (finding approximately one-third of tort injurers
assumed responsibility prior to any grievance). Ultimately, however, I do not think the matter
can be easily refuted or proven empirically. Let me simply state that I have a different view.
197. Conversely, before bringing a claim, a plaintiff should have good cause to believe
that his claim is not frivolous. See FED. R. Ci. P. 11(b). This, too, may call for a plaintiff to
do some investigation before leveling a charge.
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did, check one's records. If one has doubts about the law, speak to
one's lawyer. These duties apply, I suggest, when one either believes or
suspects that one has committed an injury, and, of course, when
another has raised an accusation, there is reason for suspicion.
If the putative injurer is unsure of what happened, let him first
investigate. If, following such investigation, he concludes that he is
clearly responsible for one piece but unsure about some other piece,
then let him at least take responsibility for the first piece."' Not only is
this the moral course, but it will help to focus subsequent discussions
and possible legal proceedings on what they properly should be
focused, namely, on issues of fact and law where there is genuine
dispute. Further, generally speaking, such an approach is strategically
sound if litigation ensues. If a settlement is not reached, such
investigations will be useful preparation for litigation.'99
Let me conclude this section with two brief "epistemological"
comments. First, the injurer's mor] choice rests not upon whether the
injured party can obtain adequate evidence to prove the injurer's fault
in court, but rather upon what the injurer knows and can discover
through investigation. Often injurers know what they have done, and,
simultaneously, injured parties lack the evidence to prove it in court, as
when a driver hits a parked car and "takes off" leaving the parked car's
owner no way of knowing who caused the damage. The moral injurer
resists exploiting the lack of proof This points to a weakness with
Johnson's view that, "you do not know [a cause] to be good or bad till
198. Some may ask, if the injurer's external denial is rooted in a subconscious,
intrapsychic denial, can the injurer be faulted for failing to take responsibility? Further, if the
presence of intrapsychic denial is not a binary, dichotomous event, but can be found to some
degree (e.g., minor rationalization) in many cases, might not that challenge apply broadly? I
will not explore these matters in depth here. Let me briefly suggest that injurers may also
have a duty of self-invesigation, that is, to examine not just the events, but themselves
carefully-to do some "soul searching" as it were. Especially given that self-serving
cognitive biases exist in the context of conflict, see generally BARRERS TO CONFLICT
RESOLUTION 26-61 (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds., 1995), when an accident occurs or when a
claim of one's fault has been brought, a moral agent ought to look at himself with a critical
eye. As to the issue of excuse, I agree with the proposition that the greater the intrapsychic
denial the more compassionately we should judge the injurer. In the extreme, this becomes a
form of an insanity defense. However, even for an injurer who suffers from intrapsychic
denial, his act of denial remains, in my view, a moral breach.
199. Some may fear the injurer's investigation will yield facts that, but for the
investigation, would not have been discoverable by the other side-that through investigation
the injurer may generate "ammunition" that will ultimately backfire against him. Observe,
however, that the moral injurer wants to pay what he should appropriately pay rather than the
least he can pay. See supra Part IVB.2. Against that backdrop, the backfire risk is greatly
diminished.
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the Judge determines it."2°  Once the judge or jury makes its
determination, technically all one knows is the judge's or jury's
determination. One cannot assume that one knows actual guilt or
innocence in fact, i.e., how the case would be decided by one fully
informed of both the actual events and the law. Second, the discussion
above focuses on the injurer's (the client's) knowledge rather than the
lawyer's knowledge. Johnson's "epistemological demurrer"-claiming
that guilt and innocence cannot be known until after legal
proceedings-makes far more sense when applied, as Johnson does, to
the lawyer than when applied to the client.2' Again, we should not
confuse lawyers' ethics with clients' ethics.
V CONCLUSION
Taking responsibility for an injury one has caused is a
fundamental moral lesson. Yet it is a lesson that members of our
society commonly ignore, often with the support, if not
encouragement, of lawyers. Injured parties pay a large price for this
approach. Injurers pay a large price as well, for the failure to take
responsibility when one has injured another is a profound act of moral
regression. In this Article, I have argued that injurers have a moral
obligation to actively, not passively, take responsibility for harms they
commit. Externally imposed accountability is no moral substitute for
internally chosen responsibility. I have also argued that, possible
economic benefits notwithstanding, those who deny responsibility for
harms they commit face significant psychological and spiritual risks.
Even if he "gets away with it," the injurer does so at his moral peril.
Injured parties, society, and, above all, injurers would each benefit
tremendously if, after injuries occur, the norm is shifted from injurers
denying responsibility to embracing responsibility. The first step to
that change is recognizing the problem. Whether clients and lawyers
will change the roles they play in that process remains to be seen.
200. BOSWELL, supra note 193, at 40.
201. The phrase "epistemological demurrer" comes from Rhode, supra note 11, at
618, in which references to the rich debate on Johnson's epistemological defense of lawyers'
ethics can be found.
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